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"THE KEY WORD IS STUDENT": HAZEL WOOD
CENSORSHIP
CRASHES THE IVY-COVERED GATES
FRANK D. LOMONTE*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier in 1988, First Amendment advocates took comfort that the
damage inflicted by the ruling-in which the Court greatly reduced free-
speech rights in public schools-would be confined to primary and
2
secondary education. But that confidence now turns out to have been
misplaced. With the Sixth Circuit's 2012 ruling in Ward v. Polite,3 four
federal circuits have now explicitly embraced Hazelwood as the standard
by which all student speech-even that of adult-aged, postsecondary
students-is to be judged.4  Only one circuit, the First, has expressly
rejected Hazelwood in the college setting. Ward follows an increasingly
common pattern in which colleges assert the Hazelwood level of control
over their students' speech: A student voices opposition to school
curriculum, often on moral or religious grounds, in ways that the
* Executive Director, Student Press Law Center, Arlington, Va. J.D.,
University of Georgia (2000). Special thanks are due to Adam Ezra Schulman for
legal research and insights informing this Article.
1. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
2. See, e.g., J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End ofan Era? The Decline
of Student Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhimeier,
1988 DUKE L.J. 706, 707 (1988) (predicting, based on favorable pre-Hazelwood case
law, that even after Hazelwood, the First Amendment status of college student media
would "retain the vitality derived from the history of student press litigation in the
past twenty years").
3. 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012).
4. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Ala. Student
Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989). The Ninth
Circuit's position, described infra at notes 130-37, 139-41, is at best confusing.
5. See Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473,
480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989).
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college's administration believes reflect unfitness for the student's course
6of study.
The expansion of Hazelwood into these factual settings
exemplifies how the decision has become unmoored from its
foundations. The characterization of Hazelwood in cases such as the
Tenth Circuit's Fleming v. Jefferson County School Distric -that it
governs anything that "affects the learning process" -would be
unrecognizable to the Hazelwood Court. In Hazelwood, the Supreme
Court carved out a category of "curricular" speech that, in the majority's
view, was entitled to minimal First Amendment protection.9 The Court's
justifications can be broadly categorized as (1) the "maturity" rationale
(that vulnerable student listeners need protection against harmful speech)
and (2) the "disassociation" rationale (that schools should be free to
disown speech that associates the school with controversial political
views or that sets a poor educational example).'o Neither of these
rationales justifies upsetting the long-accepted judicial disfavor for
censorship on college campuses.
The Supreme Court used Hazelwood as the vehicle to import into
the schoolhouse the "forum" analysis that applies when a speaker seeks
to use government property to deliver a message." But when a college
student criticizes the way that a course is taught-especially when the
criticism is delivered in a private conversation with the instructor, as in
the case of Michigan college student (and Sixth Circuit plaintiff) Julea
Ward2 -none of Hazelwood's purposes apply.
Because college campuses are-legally, and in practical
reality-accepted as gathering places for the exchange of individual
6. See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875-76 (11th Cir. 2011)
(applying Hazelwood in ruling that a state university can bar a student from a course
of study due to the student's expressed views on homosexuality); Axson-Flynn, 356
F.3d at 1282; Heenan v. Rhodes, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1238-40 (M.D. Ala. 2010)
(applying Hazelwood in denying plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim),
modifiedon reh'g, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
7. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
8. Id. at 931.
9. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
10. See id. at 270-72.
11. See id. at 270-71 (ruling that schools have greater leeway in controlling
speech when the medium for the speech is school-sponsored).
12. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730-31 (6th Cir. 2012).
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ideas and theories, colleges have little need to "disassociate" themselves
from a speaker's distasteful message. Reasonable listeners do not
ascribe to the college the views of individual students-and certainly not
those of students who are criticizing the college's curriculum. The
doctrine of academic freedom, which has little-to-no judicial recognition
at the K-12 level, protects the sanctity of the college campus as a place
where speech that pushes against accepted convention is not merely
tolerated, but encouraged. Since at least some courts believe that
Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, 14 the expansion of
Hazelwood into the college setting means that, in substantial portions of
the country, a public university may censor or discipline speech on the
basis of the speaker's viewpoint with no greater showing than a
deferentially reviewed facsimile of reasonableness.
The Hazelwood level of control is more justifiable in the
"captive audience" setting of a K-12 school, where attendance is legally
compulsory and offended listeners may not always be able to avert their
15
eyes. (It should not be forgotten that the boundary drawn in
Hazelwood-that a school may censor upon showing "legitimate
pedagogical concerns"' 6 -derived directly from the "legitimate
penological interests" standard set by the Court a year earlier in the
13. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (recognizing that
colleges are uniquely a "marketplace of ideas") (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957)
(plurality opinion), id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)). References
to college and university campuses throughout this Article will necessarily refer to
public institutions, since the First Amendment protects only against censorship by
state actors. See Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976)
(citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).
14. See Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 926 (10th Cir.
2002) ("[W]e conclude that Hazelwood allows educators to make viewpoint-based
decisions about school-sponsored speech."). But see Planned Parenthood v. Clark
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that "reasonableness"
standard under Hazelwood implicitly includes viewpoint neutrality); Searcey v.
Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that, even after Hazelwood,
school administrators are obligated "to make decisions relating to speech which are
viewpoint neutral"). See also Seidman v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69,
327 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1108 (D. Ariz. 2004) (detailing circuit split over viewpoint
neutrality).
15. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
16. Id. at 273.
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context of censorship by prisons in Turner v. Safley.17) The interests of
the school, the speaker, and the listener balance out quite differently
when the audience is made up of adults who are free to leave.
If restored to its originally understood boundaries, Hazelwood
will apply only to a very narrow range of truly "curricular" speech 9 (and
indeed, arguably, not even to the Hazelwood facts themselves). 20 When
a student speaks in the context of an assigned academic exercise, the
student's interest in individual expression is relatively low-indeed, an
audience member may reasonably believe that the student is reciting a
school-mandated viewpoint, like the debate-team member who must
argue the side to which her team is assigned.2 1 In that setting, the
educational value of the lesson arguably can override the individual's
22expressive interest in the message, if the two are irreconcilable.
Hazelwood was not intended to, and should never have
developed into, a free-floating infirmity that accompanies "student"
status.23 The Ward court's assertion-that when applying Hazelwood
"[t]he key word is student"24 -is entirely wrong. The key word in
Hazelwood is "forum," and because college campuses are widely
17. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
18. See discussion infra Part III.C. 1.
19. See infra Part II.D.2.
20. As the Eighth Circuit observed in ruling in the students' favor, substantial
evidence indicated that the Spectrum newspaper "was intended to be and operated as
a conduit for student viewpoint" rather than primarily as a vehicle for teaching.
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986). For
example, a local board of education policy stated that "[s]chool sponsored student
publications will not restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of
responsible journalism" and expressly protected students' right to freely discuss
"controversial" issues. Likewise, a policy statement, published in the first
newspaper of each school year explicitly disclaimed school responsibility for any of
the individual student viewpoints expressed in Spectrum, quoted the Tinker case by
name and asserted that the newspaper "as a student-press publication, accepts all
rights implied by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution[.]" Id. at
1373.
21. See infra Part Ill.B.
22. See infra Part 1I1.B.
23. See discussion infra Part II.D. 1.
24. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
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recognized as public forums,25 the Hazelwood doctrine should have
virtually no relevance to the content-based regulation of speech by
college students.
Cases such as Ward present a special threat by extending
Hazelwood from a case about disowning sponsorship of speech into a
case about disciplining speech. Lowering the bar for the punishment of
speech-so that a student may be suspended or expelled for essentially
any basis a college decides is "reasonable"-is flatly inconsistent with
decades of First Amendment and due process jurisprudence.26 It is,
moreover, societally undesirable. The public is increasingly reliant on
27
college journalists as primary providers of news. The chilling effect of
empowering colleges to punish speakers virtually at will imposes an
intolerable toll on students' ability to blow the whistle on wrongdoing
28
and to engage in candid journalistic and editorial speech.
Existing First Amendment doctrine provides ample basis for
colleges to exercise legitimate control over speech at the extremes.29 But
speech that neither disrupts class work nor crosses real-world legal
boundaries-such as threats of violence or severe and pervasive
harassment-is properly counteracted by counter-speech, not by
regulation and punishment. 3 0
II. STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE AND HAZEL WOOD
A. The Pre-Hazelwood Landscape
Every graduate of a high-school civics course is familiar at some
level with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
25. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836
(1995) ("For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular
viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in
one of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectual life, its college and university
campuses.").
26. See discussion infra Part Ill.C.4.
27. See infra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.
29. See discussion infra Part V.
30. See discussion infra Part VI.
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District,3' the case most remembered for its resounding declaration that
students and teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 32 In Tinker, the Court
found that an Iowa school district violated students' First Amendment
rights by suspending them for refusing to remove armbands worn to
express opposition to the war in Vietnam. While the students' protest
provoked some animated discussion among classmates, the Court held
that nothing short of a "material and substantial interference with
schoolwork or discipline" could justify punishment.34 Significantly, the
Court made no distinction as to where on school premises the armbands
35were worn.
To be sure, Tinker represents a compromise level of protection
well short of what an adult citizen could expect if punished under a
content-based government regulation. Outside of school, restrictions on
the content of speech bear a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality,
and, as the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Snyder v. Phelps36 (the
"Westboro Baptist Church case"), even speech of minimal value to
public discourse that is calculated to outrage the vast majority of its
listeners is immune from content-based government sanction.37 The
Tinker Court declined to go so far, recognizing that the constitutional
right of free expression must be "applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment."3 8
In the view of most courts, Tinker provides, despite later-created
doctrinal exceptions, the default standard against which all content-based
31. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
32. Id. at 506.
33. Id. at 504, 514.
34. Id. at 508, 511.
35. See id. at 508-10.
36. 562 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
37. See generally id. (involving protesters who picketed outside of the funeral
of a United States Marine's funeral carrying signs reading "Thank God for Dead
Soldiers" and "Priests Rape Boys"); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989) (observing, in invalidating a statute making it a criminal offense to burn a
flag as a form of protest, that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
38. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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restrictions on student speech are to be judged.39 Tinker has widely,
though not unanimously, gained acceptance as the applicable standard at
the postsecondary level as well. The Supreme Court's college speech
jurisprudence can be interpreted as putting college students on par with
adult citizens in the off-campus world,4 0 and some courts maintain that
Tinker is insufficiently protective at the college level.4 1 But most circuits
have adopted Tinker as the starting point for analyzing censorship of
college students' expression. Consequently, to the extent that subsequent
student-speech cases such as Hazelwood are read as creating doctrinal
exceptions to Tinker, that erosion places the First Amendment rights of
college students at risk.
B. The Development ofForum Doctrine
Over an evolving series of cases dating back to the 1930s, the
Supreme Court developed the construct of the "forum" to determine the
39. See Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 325-26 (2d Cir. 2006); Newsom v.
Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 255-57 (4th Cir. 2003); Saxe v. State Coll.
Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch.
Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992); Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F.
Supp. 2d 731, 739-40 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (noting that eight of the circuits agree that
"Tinker provides the default rule for suppression of student speech" and that
subsequent cases function as "narrow exceptions to the rule").
40. See Daniel A. Applegate, Stop the Presses: The Impact of Hosty v. Carter
and Pitt News v. Pappert on the Editorial Freedom of College Newspapers, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 247, 271 (2005) ("College students are more mature than high
school students, possess the same rights as other adults, and are entitled to the same
protection of these rights as granted to a noncollege student of the same age and
maturity. The concern of the Court in Hazelwood regarding the age and maturity of
the students is not present at the college level.").
41. See McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010)
(observing that the Supreme Court's student-speech jurisprudence "cannot be taken
as gospel in cases involving public universities," and concluding, "[p]ublic
universities have significantly less leeway in regulating student speech than public
elementary or high schools"); see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314
(3d Cir. 2008) ("[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that,
because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should
apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to
the contrary, 'the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools."') (quoting Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
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permissible level of regulation when a speaker seeks to use government
property as a conduit for expression. The doctrine is rooted in the
understanding that, while all government property belongs to the public,
not all government property is equally amenable to communicative use.
A "forum" may be a physical space, such as the steps of a courthouse, or
it may be "metaphysical," such as a government financing system.42
It is clearly and universally accepted that certain public spaces,
chiefly sidewalks and parks, qualify as "traditional public forums" that
by their nature and history are fully compatible with wide-open
expressive use.43 In those traditional forums, the government's ability to
regulate is at its lowest. The government may impose reasonable and
content-neutral curbs on the time, place, and manner of speech (such as a
"no electric bullhorns after midnight" rule). But if a regulation is
directed at the speaker's message, then it is presumed unconstitutional
and will be struck down if it is not the least restrictive means of fulfilling
a compelling government interest. 44
Beyond that, very little about the forum doctrine is clear and
universally accepted. When government property is held open to
speakers for "indiscriminate use," a "designated" public forum is created,
with the same protection against content-based regulation as a traditional
public forum.45 Although the term is at times loosely used
interchangeably with "designated" public forum, the law also appears to
recognize a distinct class of "limited" public forums that are
42. Examples of nonphysical "forums" have included a charitable fundraising
drive in a government office, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 800 (1986), and the public comment period at a city council meeting,
Rowe v. Cocoa, Fla., 358 F.3d 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2004).
43. In the case often regarded as the wellspring of the forum doctrine, Hague
v. Committee for Industrial Organization, the Supreme Court recognized that the
government's regulatory authority was at its lowest in streets and parks, places that
"have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions." 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
44. Where strict scrutiny applies, any content-based restriction "must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest." Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
45. In a designated public forum, as in a traditional public forum, reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. See Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
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"designated" for use only by a subcategory of the public or for a
46particular type of speech. Property that is neither traditionally open to
public discourse nor held open by government designation is referred to
as a "nonpublic forum.',47 In a nonpublic forum, government regulation
of speech need be only reasonable and viewpoint neutral.48
While forum doctrine evolved over decades, it found its clearest
expression in the Court's 1983 decision in Perry Education Association
v. Perry Local Educators' Association.49 An examination of that case is
helpful to understand how the forum doctrine made its way across the
schoolhouse threshold, and why that doctrine is ill fitting to the college
campus in general and to the Ward fact pattern in particular.
46. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) ("When
the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to and does not
allow persons to engage in every type of speech. The State may be justified in
reserving its forum for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.")
(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995)) (internal quotes and brackets omitted). The Supreme Court has been less
than optimally disciplined when it comes to the nomenclature of public forums, but
if the characterization in Good News Club is accurate-that any regulation "must not
discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint" and must be "reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum"-then there is no discernibly greater
protection in a limited public forum than in a nonpublic forum. Id. at 106-07.
47. Commentators have persuasively argued that the nonpublic forum analysis
fails to distinguish between spaces that are amenable to expressive use yet are not
made available for that purpose (such as the pages of a class-produced curricular
newspaper) versus those that simply are unsuited to public expression at all (for
instance, a nuclear missile silo). See Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First
Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases
Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 786 (2009);
Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
647, 655 (2010). This is not a meaningless distinction, for in the former case it
might at times make sense to entertain a constitutional inquiry into the reasons that a
vehicle otherwise suited to expressive purposes was structured otherwise-for
example, where it can be shown that a university, favoring the incumbent student
government regime that is passive and compliant, deliberately engineers the "forum"
of the election system so as to discourage competition. See generally Husain v.
Springer, 494 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding an actionable First Amendment claim
where a college administration canceled and rescheduled a student government
election with the intent to negate the impact of a student newspaper's endorsement).
48. Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 470.
49. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
In Perry Education Association, a teacher's union challenged an
Indiana school district's practice of allowing only one union, the
officially certified collective-bargaining representative for teachers, to
use school mailboxes to distribute messages to teachers.50 The Seventh
Circuit held that denying the competing union an opportunity to reach its
intended audience violated the First Amendment.5 1  But the Supreme
52
Court, applying forum doctrine, reversed.
The Court found that the mailboxes constituted a nonpublic
forum, and access therefore could be regulated in any reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral manner. The Court recognized that property such as
the mailboxes could become a dedicated public forum either by express
declaration or by a showing that, in practice, the boxes had been held
open "for indiscriminate use by the general public." 5 4 Neither was the
case in Perry Education Association-the boxes had always been limited
to use by those with official school business, with exceptions selectively
made for a few outside entities such as the Cub Scouts. 55
The justification for allowing the government to pick-and-choose
among approved speakers and even approved topics in a nonpublic
forum is important, though it frequently is overlooked when forum
doctrine is invoked in furtherance of a school's control of student speech.
The Court explained in Perry Education Association that the government
could ration the expressive use of property such as school mailboxes to
"preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated.' The Court went on to explain that the ability to
discriminate among users was necessary for the government to restrict
usage to "activities compatible with the intended purpose of the
property." 57
50. Id. at 41.
51. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1286-87 (7th Cir.
1981).
52. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 55.
53. Id. at 48-49.
54. Id. at 47. See also Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117 (3d Cir. 1992)
("The determination of whether the government has designated a public forum is
based upon two factors: governmental intent and the extent of use granted.").
55. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 47.
56. Id. at 46 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114,129 (1981)).
57. Id. at 49.
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C. Hazelwood Changes the Landscape
1. What the Hazelwood Court Decided58
The Hazelwood case began with a double-page spread of news
articles prepared for publication in Spectrum, the student newspaper at
St. Louis-area Hazelwood East High School.59 While seemingly tame by
today's tabloid-television standards, the stories-one about teen
pregnancy, and another about the consequences of divorce on children-
drew the attention of Principal Robert Reynolds, who flagged the stories
as problematic and instructed the newspaper's printing vendor to replace
the articles with blank white space.60 Three student editors filed suit,
arguing that the school district failed to carry its burden under Tinker of
demonstrating that the stories would have materially disrupted school
functions.6 1
After a bench trial, the federal district court ruled in the school's
favor and found no unlawful censorship.62 Presaging the Supreme
Court's ultimate resolution, the district court recognized a new First
Amendment tier, less protective than Tinker, for speech that is part of an
official school activity: "Where the particular program or activity is an
58. Although the following discussion concerns the treatment only of student
speech, some courts have regarded Hazelwood as applying equally to the
"curricular" speech of teachers in the classroom. See, e.g., Vanderhurst v. Colo.
Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2000); Lacks v. Ferguson
Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor
Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723-24 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v.
Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 917
F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990). The policy considerations weigh differently when
the speaker is a government authority figure, however, since a teacher's in-class
speech-unlike that of a student-might reasonably be taken for the official voice of
the school. Moreover, in recent years teacher speech has more commonly been
analyzed under a balancing-of-interests test applicable to speech by public
employees that the Supreme Court coined in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1968), and elaborated on in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), and
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). The First Amendment treatment of
teacher speech consequently is beyond the scope of this Article.
59. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1988).
60. Id. at 264.
61. Id.
62. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
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integral part of the school's educational function, something less than
substantial disruption of the educational process may justify prior
restraints on students' speech and press activities."63 The Eighth Circuit,
identifying Spectrum as "a vehicle for First Amendment expression,"
reversed. 4 The court found that the school was obligated to use less
restrictive measures, such as briefly delaying publication to seek the
student editors' concurrence with any necessary changes.65
The Supreme Court took up the case in its 1987 term with a
vacancy left by Justice Lewis Powell's retirement-Justice Anthony
Kennedy would not fill the seat until February 1988-and decided it on a
5-3 vote in the school district's favor. 66 Justice Byron White's majority
opinion struck a distinction between the students' class-produced speech
in Spectrum and the individual expression of the student antiwar
protesters in Tinker: "The question whether the First Amendment
63. Id. at 1463. Curiously, Judge Francis Nangle's compilation of case law
about the censorship of student media accurately cited the holdings of a number of
pre-Hazelwood rulings-nearly all of them affirming the right of students to publish
controversial material over the objection of school authorities-and yet derived from
them the opposite conclusion. See id. at 1463 (citing, in support of the conclusion
that students have reduced legal protection when writing in curricular student
publications, the following cases in which courts in fact ruled in favor of the First
Amendment rights of student journalists, Gambino v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 564
F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977) (enjoining educators from prohibiting publication of article
in school newspaper); Stanton v. Brunswick Sch. Dep't, 577 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Ma.
1984) (prohibiting school officials from preventing publication of student quote in
yearbook); Reineke v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(enjoining school district from censoring and controlling student newspaper
published by journalism class); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y.
1974), sum. affd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that school authorities
violated students' rights in seizing and preventing distribution of sex information
supplement in school newspaper); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (enjoining school officials from prohibiting publication of Vietnam protest ad
in school newspaper)). Consistent with Judge Nangle's legal research-but
inconsistent with his characterization of the research-it was overwhelmingly the
opinion of lower courts before Hazelwood that nothing less than a Tinker-level of
disruption to school activities would justify censoring student-produced media, even
when the media was part of a journalism course.
64. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375 (8th Cir. 1986)
(citing Gambino v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736 (E.D.Va.), affd,
564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977)).
65. Id. at 1375.
66. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276.
requires a school to tolerate particular student speech-the question that
we addressed in Tinker-is different from the question whether the First
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student
,,67speech.' This distinction between tolerating and promoting was crucial
to the Court's ability to steer a course around Tinker without overruling
it: "[W]e conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining
when a school may punish student expression need not also be the
standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and
resources to the dissemination of student expression." 68 In place of the
highly protective Tinker standard-requiring the government to
demonstrate "material and substantial disruption"-the majority
concluded that school officials could lawfully censor "school-sponsored
expressive activities" merely by showing that "their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 6 9
The Hazelwood majority cited four primary justifications for
reducing the level of protection when speech is subsidized by the school
as a curricular exercise:
(1) The role of the school in "awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment."70
(2) The school's need "to take into account the emotional
maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate
student speech on potentially sensitive topics." 71
(3) The school's ability "to set high standards for the student
speech that is disseminated under its auspices." 72
(4) The importance of disassociating the school from speech that
advocates conduct "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized
social order"' or that "associate[s] the school with any position other
than neutrality on matters of political controversy."73
67. Id. at 270-71.
68. Id. at 272-73.
69. Id at 273.
70. Id. at 272.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 271-72.
73. Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986)).
3172013] THE KEY WORD IS STUDENT
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
These justifications can be broadly understood as the "maturity"
rationale (justifications 1 and 2) and the "disassociation" rationale
74(justifications 3 and 4). The Court explained what would qualify as a
legitimate pedagogical purpose for censorship by reference to these
objectives. To fulfill the instructional purpose of the curricular exercise,
a school could refuse to distribute student expression that is
"ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences."7 5
In furtherance of the "disassociation" rationale, a school could refuse to
disseminate speech that promotes vices (drug use, drinking,
"irresponsible sex") or that attributes a politically controversial
76
viewpoint to the school.
In a rousing dissent, Justice William Brennan prophetically
anticipated how schools would misuse their newfound latitude to
suppress speech that challenges authority. Censorship, he admonished,
"in no way furthers the curricular purposes of a student newspaper,
unless one believes that the purpose of the school newspaper is to teach
students that the press ought never report bad news, express unpopular
views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors." He cautioned
that the majority's approach would give license to a regime of "thought
control" in which unprincipled administrators "can camouflage
viewpoint discrimination as the 'mere' protection of students from
sensitive topics."7 8
The Hazelwood Court was unclear whether the new legal
standard it was creating should apply in the postsecondary context. In an
oft-cited footnote, Justice White remarked that the Court "need not now
decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect
74. See Edward L. Carter, Kevin R. Kemper & Barbara L. Morgenstem,
Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum Doctrine and Government Speech in
the U.S. Court of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REv. 157, 161 (2006) ("Since 1988, the
Court's opinion in Hazelwood . .. has stood for the proposition that public school
administrators may regulate student speech that would otherwise be protected by the
First Amendment when that speech involves topics sensitive to an immature
audience and when students' messages might be attributed to the school itself.").
75. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
76. Id at 272.
77. Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level."7 9
In the ensuing twenty-five years, the Court has never clarified
Justice White's equivocal remark, and has had occasion to refer to
Hazelwood only a handful of times. In Board of Regents of University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth,80 a case involving the disbursement of
student activity fees to campus clubs, Justice David Souter's concurrence
cited Hazelwood as an instance in which the ability of institutions to limit
student expression has been confined to K-12 schools, observing that
"students and their schools' relation to them are different and at least
arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college education."
Ten years later, the Court made passing reference to Hazelwood in
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,82 which determined that the state-
run Hastings College of the Law could deny official recognition to clubs
that enforced ideological barriers to membership. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's majority opinion approvingly cited Hazelwood to support the
proposition that judges should "resist 'substitut[ing] their own notions of
sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they
review."'8 4 In neither instance did the Court squarely confront whether
the Hazelwood framework applies to student speech at the college level.
That omission may be meaningful given that both cases involved speech
subsidized by student fees, and a fee system is a classic example of a
case lending itself to analysis as a metaphysical forum. At a minimum,
there is no affirmative indication that the Court will impose the
Hazelwood framework when asked directly to evaluate a content-based
restriction on college students' speech.
79. Id. at 274 n.7 (majority opinion).
80. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
81. Id. at 238 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring).
82. 561 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
83. Id. at 2994.
84. Id. at 2988 (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson
Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)).
85. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830
(1995) (recognizing student activity fee funding system at the University of Virginia
as a "metaphysical" forum requiring viewpoint-neutrality in the apportionment of
grants to student publications).
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D. Hazelwood Broadens Beyond the Newsroom
While Hazelwood began its life as an exception to the Tinker
doctrine, today it might more honestly be said, at least at the K-12 level,
that misapplications have turned Tinker into an exception to the
Hazelwood doctrine. Once forum doctrine invaded the province of the
public school, courts began subdividing school buildings into ever-
thinning slivers, shrinking the square footage covered by the Tinker level
of protection almost out of existence. Courts have largely fulfilled
Justice Brennan's worst fears, slavishly deferring to school censorship
decisions even where the speaker's message is not harmful to the
audience but merely deviates from the school's "party line."86
1. Hazelwood has Been Misapplied to Speech Not Reasonably
Mistaken for That of the School
Courts have applied Hazelwood even where no reasonable
listener would confuse individual speech for the officially sanctioned
87
word of the school. Student campaign speeches, commemorative wall
88 89
tiles and decorative murals, and graduation songs have all been swept
86. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual
Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 81 (1990)
(characterizing the drift of school-speech caselaw as "unmistakably toward
unquestioned deference to the decisions of school administrators"). A rare-but
perhaps revealing-exception to unchecked Hazelwood deference occurred in
Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989). In Searcey, the Eleventh
Circuit-even after finding that a "career day" program at a public high school
qualified as "curricular"-decided that the selective exclusion of an anti-war
organization was impermissible viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 1324-25. Tellingly,
the speaker in Searcey was not a student, but an outside organization of adults. See
id. at 1315.
87. See Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989) (involving a
student government campaign speech over a school intercom system).
88. See Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cnty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1212-15
(11th Cir. 2004) (regarding a mural painted on sheets of plywood as part of
beautification project); Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 925-26
(10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (pertaining to student-designed wall tiles memorializing
victims of the 1999 massacre at Columbine High School).
89. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1093-95 (9th Cir. 2009)
(involving the choice of songs to be played at a graduation ceremony).
under the umbrella of a rule designed to enable schools to disassociate
themselves from speech "that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 90
In a rare faithful application, a federal district court in 2010 held
that Tinker, not Hazelwood, provided the proper framework for an
eighth-grader's challenge to punishment imposed for violent imagery in
his class-produced essays.91 Carefully analyzing the rationale for
Hazelwood, the court recognized that a student's speech on an
assignment meant only for the teacher's eyes "does not raise the same
concerns as other school-sponsored speech cases such as Hazelwood"
where speech is directed at young listeners: "This case does not involve a
risk that other students would be exposed to the violent themes of [the
student's] writings or that [the student's] speech might be wrongly
attributed to the school."92
More commonly, however, courts have come to gloss over-if
not to express open disregard for-the audience-protection and
disassociation rationales of Hazelwood, treating the standard as
controlling except in the narrow instance that speech appears on the
student's own body, such as a message on a t-shirt.9 3 Courts have treated
Hazelwood as if its boundaries set forth by the Supreme Court were
merely a starting point from which lower courts were free to deviate,
rather than binding legal precedent. For example, the Sixth Circuit
dismissed the First Amendment claims of an elementary school student
90. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
91. See Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 7:07-CV-10682, 2010
WL 6501655 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 16, 2010).
92. Id. at *8.
93. See Dan V. Kozlowski, Hazelwood's Application in the Circuit Courts, 3
U.B. J. OF MEDIA L. & ETHICS 1, 6 (2012), available at
http://law.ubalt.edu/downloads/law-downloads/UBJMLEVol.3_Nos. 1 -2.pdf
("[C]ircuit courts have broadly applied Hazelwood - both in terms of when it is
applied and to whom-and expansively interpreted the 'legitimate pedagogical
concerns' standard, generally granting wide discretion to school officials. This
makes Hazelwood doubly dangerous."). For an example of a faithful application of
the "imprimatur" doctrine to messages on students' personal apparel, see Castorina
v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 543 (6th Cir. 2001) (declining to apply
Hazelwood to school's refusal to allow two students to wear t-shirts bearing
Confederate flag emblems: "Most importantly, no reasonable observer could
conclude that the school had somehow endorsed the students' display of the
Confederate flag.").
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who was prohibited from selling candy canes accompanied by Christian
religious messages as part of a make-believe "store" exercise, where
students learned the workings of retail establishments by trading
homemade goods: "Plaintiff suggests that Hazelwood only applies if the
audience might mistake the speech as originating from the school.
However, that reading is too narrow. This court has applied the
Hazelwood standard when the speech at issue was made as part of school
activities." 9 4  The Sixth Circuit's formulation-"part of school
activities"-appears to swallow significant amounts of speech
(including, perhaps, the student vendor's speech in Curry) that the school
is being asked merely to "tolerate" rather than "affirmatively to
promote."
The willingness of subsequent courts to read the "imprimatur"
requirement out of Hazelwood is perhaps best illustrated by the Third
Circuit's split decision in a 2000 case involving an elementary-school
student's religious-themed poster.96 In C.H. v. Oliva, the en banc court
split 6-6 over a student's claim that the school violated his First
Amendment rights by removing his drawing of Jesus from a hallway
98display of student art. While there was no majority opinion, the split
resulted in affirmance of the trial court's ruling dismissing most claims-
a result decried by then-Judge Samuel Alito. In dissent, Judge Alito
94. Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 577 (6th Cir. 2008).
95. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit's
formulation of what constituted a valid justification for censorship in Curry appeared
capable of being mischievously applied to any student speech, even individual
speech divorced from school activities: "The school's desire to avoid having its
curricular event offend other children or their parents, and to avoid subjecting young
children to an unsolicited religious promotional message that might conflict with
what they are taught at home qualifies as a valid educational purpose." Curry, 513
F.3d at 579. The Supreme Court has never said that "offensive" speech is
proscribable in schools, and to the contrary, has suggested the opposite is true. See
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007) (rejecting school's argument that a
student's pro-drug banner at a school-sanctioned event could be censored because its
message was offensive: "After all, much political and religious speech might be
perceived as offensive to some.").
96. See C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
97. 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
98. Id. at 200-03.
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wrote that the case should have been governed by Tinker rather than-as
the three-judge panel below believed-by Hazelwood:9 9
While Hazelwood certainly applies to many things
that occur in the classroom . . . nothing in
Hazelwood suggests that its standard applies when
a student is called upon to express his or her
personal views in class or in an assignment. On the
contrary, Hazelwood governs only those expressive
activities that might reasonably be perceived "to
bear the imprimatur of the school." . . . Things that
students express in class or in assignments when
called upon to express their own views do not 'bear
the imprimatur of the school" . . . and do not
represent "the [school's] own speech."
100
Judge Alito went on to decry the "disturbing results" that an expansive
view of Hazelwood would produce: Students "could be prevented from
expressing any views that school officials could reasonably believe
would cause 'resentment' by other students or their parents . . . . Such a
regime is antithetical to the First Amendment and the form of self-
government that it was intended to foster."
0'
Revealingly, in its one opportunity to expand the scope of
Hazelwood at the high school level, the Supreme Court pointedly
declined the invitation. In Morse v. Frederick, the Court dealt with the
case of a high school senior suspended for waving a banner bearing what
was deemed to be a pro-drug message-"Bong Hits 4 Jesus"-while
among classmates during a school-approved outing to watch the Olympic
torch relay run.102 The Court deemed the event to be "school
sanctioned"103-the rally took place on a hill across from school, under
the supervision of school employees, during a school-authorized release
day-and consequently declared Joseph Frederick's banner to be "school
99. See id. at 213-14.
100. Id. at 213-14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271;
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995))
(internal citations omitted) (brackets in original).
101. Id. at 214 (Alito, J., dissenting).
102. 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007).
103. Id. at 396.
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speech." 10 4 Nevertheless, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the
majority, summarily concluded that Hazelwood "does not control this
case because no one would reasonably believe that Frederick's banner
bore the school's imprimatur.",i
0 5
It would have been a simple matter for the Morse Court to
declare that the impromptu assembly was a "nonpublic forum," the
educational purpose of which was to promote school unity or to teach
obedience in group gatherings, but there is no indication that such a view
was even seriously entertained. This message has yet to register with
lower courts, which even post-Morse continue to apply Hazelwood in
settings that no observer, other than a constitutional lawyer, could regard
as "curricular" or could mistake for an official school communication. 106
2. Hazelwood has Been Misapplied to Speech Unconnected with a
Curricular Activity
In everyday conversation, students, parents, and school
employees clearly understand the distinction between activities that are
"curricular" (coursework) and those that are "extracurricular" (clubs,
sports, social events). Although Hazelwood by its terms applies to
"curricular" expression, it has become disturbingly commonplace for
courts to read that prerequisite out of existence and to regard any
organized function taking place at school-or even away from school, if
the event is school-subsidized-as a "curricular" event.1 07
Courts have accomplished this sleight-of-hand-transforming
the "extracurricular" into the "curricular"-by suggesting that simply
learning how to obey the rules of an activity is itself educational. os
104. Id. at 400.
105. Id. at 405.
106. See, e.g., Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 579-80 (6th Cir.
2008) (applying Hazelwood to homemade crafts bearing religious messages that
student offered for sale at a swap-shop held in the school gym).
107. See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that a
campaign speech for student council office was Hazelwood curricular speech);
McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F. Supp. 2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (deciding
that choice of songs by high school marching band was Hazelwood curricular
speech).
108. See, e.g., Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 389 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding
that a student handing out copies of a religious parable at a school-organized "winter
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Others have indulged the fiction that anything relating to school
programs or functions is curricular. For example, in Seidman v.
Paradise Valley Unified School District No. 69,"09 a federal district court
held that a fundraising campaign in which a parent volunteer
organization sold commemorative wall tiles was a "curricular" forum
because the fundraiser was "undertaken for a primarily educational
purpose (fund raising for school playground equipment).""1 0  In other
words, even though nothing about the fundraising campaign was itself an
educational exercise, the fact that the money would advance an
educational objective-a non-curricular one at that (a playground)-was
enough to render the tile sales "curricular."
This formulation invites limitless expansion of the Hazelwood
doctrine beyond any logical stopping point. Almost any undertaking
(e.g., cooking a meal, driving a car, playing touch football) can be
"educational" in the sense of practicing and mastering that skill. If that is
all it takes to make an activity "curricular," then the presence of any
school support (e.g., the paid time of a faculty adviser, subsidized
meeting space) might transform the activity into a "nonpublic forum"
with the accompanying degree of institutional control.
III. HAZEL WOOD GOES TO COLLEGE
A. Hazelwood has Gained Increasing Acceptance as the Yardstick for
College Students'First Amendment Rights
Within months, appellate circuit courts began staking out
diverging views of Hazelwood's relevance at the college level-the
break party" was engaging in Hazelwood speech because the party was sponsored by
the school and supervised by school employees, with the goal of imparting social
skills); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cnty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding that murals made by students were curricular in part because
faculty members supervised the project); Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ.,
342 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that school holiday parties were curricular
activities subject to Hazelwood, because teachers planned, supervised and regulated
the parties), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936 (2004).
109. 327 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Ariz. 2004).
110. Id. at 1107.
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result invited by Justice White's equivocal footnote in Hazelwood."'
Perhaps fittingly, the first two circuits to address the question came out
pointing in opposite directions.
When students challenged the University of Massachusetts'
decision to withdraw funding from a free legal clinic that had represented
students in suing the University, the First Circuit declined to apply the
Supreme Court's student speech case law; instead, the court viewed the
case as a dispute over forcing the state to continue subsidizing a
service.112 In its analysis, the court contrasted the clinic (which it found
not be to be a vehicle for student expression at all) with a designated
public forum such as a student newspaper where First Amendment
protections apply.' 13 In declining to apply public forum analysis to the
students' case, the court remarked parenthetically that the Hazelwood
standard "is not applicable to college newspapers" because they operate
as public forums.114
Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit applied a broader notion of
Hazelwood's scope in a case challenging the University of Alabama's
ability to limit student government campaign speech to a narrow
electioneering window.'15 The court held that student government and
its corresponding campaigns are not a public forum, but a forum reserved
for the purpose of providing a "supervised learning experience for
students interested in politics and government."'l6 Consequently, the
court concluded that the Hazelwood rationale permitted the University to
regulate candidates' speech based on a mere justification that the
regulation was reasonable, even if the speech was not alleged to be
unlawful or disruptive.1
I11. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 n.7 (1988).
112. Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473,
477 (1st Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 480. The court went on to conclude that no First Amendment
violation occurred, both because the legal-services program was not itself a vehicle
for student expression, nor was there any showing that legal services were denied to
students on account of the content of their speech. See id. at 481-82.
114. Id. at 480 n.6.
115. Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n, 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir.
1989).
116. Id. at 1347.
117. Id.
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In a case that is closest to true "curricular" speech, the Tenth
Circuit decided in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson" that instructors at the
University of Utah did not violate a theatre student's First Amendment
rights in pressuring her to recite lines containing profanity during a class
exercise." 9 The student, an observant Mormon, resisted reading the
monologue as written and asked to omit the objectionable language.
After initially refusing, her instructor relented and allowed the student to
modify the monologue, awarding her a high grade. But at the end of the
term, faculty members advised the student: "You can choose to continue
in the program if you modify your values. If you don't, you can leave." 2 0
Believing she had no choice, the student withdrew and transferred to
another college.121
The Tenth Circuit found that the theatre classroom was neither
traditionally open to the public for expressive activity nor dedicated to
widespread public use for that purpose. Consequently, it was a
nonpublic forum, "meaning that school officials could regulate the
speech that takes place there 'in any reasonable manner.",1 22  The
justifications proffered by the University-that reciting the objectionable
lines would teach the student to portray an unfamiliar character and to
respect authors' work as written-were held to be educationally
.123
legitimate.
Contrasting with Axson-Flynn, the Sixth Circuit decided in
Kincaid v. Gibsonl24 that Hazelwood is inapplicable to "extracurricular"
speech in a college publication produced outside the classroom setting.125
In Kincaid, administrators at Kentucky State University confiscated and
refused to distribute a student-produced yearbook, The Thorobred,
because of editorial disagreements with the students' choice of theme,
colors, and photographs.126 A Sixth Circuit panel sided with the
118. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
119. Id. at 1277.
120. Id. at 1282.
121. Id. at 1282-83.
122. Id. at 1285 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270
(1988)).
123. Id. at 1291.
124. 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
125. Id. at 346 n.5.
126. Id. at 345.
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college, 12 but the en banc circuit found that the impoundment of the
yearbook violated the First Amendment.128 In declining to apply
Hazelwood, the court said that "we find it relevant that the editors of The
Thorobred and its readers are likely to be young adults"-noting that one
of the editors was thirty-seven years old-and concluded: "[T]here can
be no justification for suppressing the yearbook on the grounds that it
might be 'unsuitable for immature audiences."'l29 While Kincaid is
often shorthanded as a case repudiating Hazelwood at the college level, it
may more precisely be understood as a case accepting that Hazelwood
imported forum doctrine onto the college campus, but that publications
produced by college students outside the confines of a course are
designated public forums.
Courts in the Ninth and Second Circuits, perhaps appropriately
when confronted with a confusing legal standard, have issued mixed
signals. The Ninth Circuit case of Brown v. Li 130-which produced
three opinions, one from each panel member, and no consensus
rationale-exemplifies how divisive and confounding Hazelwood has
become.
In Brown, University of California, Santa Barbara graduate
student Christopher Brown decided, in lieu of the customary thank-you
preface to his master's thesis, to append a "Disacknowledgements"
section delivering a profane parting shot to professors and administrators
he described as "an ever-present hindrance during my graduate
career." 3 1 Although the preface was not considered a part of the graded
academic exercise-which Brown completed successfully-his thesis
committee initially declined to approve the paper, and he was placed on
academic probation.132 By the time the case got to court, Brown had
been awarded his degree-but the college declined him the customary
courtesy of having his thesis shelved at the campus library. 33
127. Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 236 F.3d
342 (6th Cir. 2001).
128. Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 356-57.
129. Id. at 352.
130. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 943.
132. Id. at 943-45.
133. Id. at 945.
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Brown's suit challenged both the initial withholding of his
degree and the refusal to stock his completed work in the library with the
"Disacknowledgements" section intact.134 A three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University on a
2-1 vote, but the decision produced three fractured rationales. The two-
judge majority broadly agreed that, under the Supreme Court's free-
speech jurisprudence, it does not offend the First Amendment to require
a student to comply with the terms of an academic assignment.13 5
Turning the Hazelwood "maturity" rationale on its head, the majority
observed:
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence does not hold
that an institution's interest in mandating its
curriculum and in limiting a student's speech to
that which is germane to a particular academic
assignment diminishes as students age. Indeed,
arguably the need for academic discipline and
editorial rigor increases as a student's learning
136progresses.
In so holding, the court knocked one of the foundational pilings from
beneath Hazelwood, turning a case about protecting impressionable
young schoolchildren into a case in which institutional control actually
increases as the speaker ages.
The majority's conception of what qualified as a lawful basis for
the University's actions also illustrates the perils of introducing so
elusive a concept as "legitimate pedagogical basis" into the law of the
First Amendment. The College, the court concluded, "was entitled to
require that the acknowledgements section . .. recognize those who made
a positive contribution to Plaintiffs education" for two reasons: (1) to
"encourage critical thinking" and (2) to "conform to professional
norms."' 37  That a college must be able to censor criticism of its
employees to encourage critical thinking seems a construct worthy of
134. Id at 945-46.
135. Id. at 949.
136. Id. at 951 (citation and emphasis omitted).
137. Id. at 953.
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George Orwell,138 and left standing alone, "conformity" swallows its
own tautological tail: We impose our authority on you to teach you to
obey authority. Every act of censorship is an effort to teach conformity.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit has equivocated on the
applicability of Hazelwood to colleges. In Hudson v. Craven,13 9 a
community college professor challenged her employer's decision to
discontinue her contract because she took a group of students to
participate in a political protest as part of a class assignment in
economics.140 The court expressed doubt about the appropriateness of
Hazelwood, even while appearing to apply it and finding that the
professor's removal was justified by "legitimate interests":
Hazelwood arose in a high school and not a
community college setting, but that does not
change the fact that the decision of a public
institution of higher education to avoid sanctioned
political entanglement is a judgment that is best left
to the institution. Although we draw from
Hazelwood the principle that educational
institutions have a strong pedagogical interest in
avoiding institutional association with potentially
divisive political issues, we need not consider
whether a college necessarily has the same leeway
as a high school to preserve that neutrality.141
While the Second Circuit is not firmly in either camp, its 2007 ruling in
Amidon v. Student Association of the State University of New Yorkl42
exhibits skepticism about affording postsecondary institutions the
breadth of deference contemplated by Hazelwood.143 In Amidon,
students whose conservative political organization was denied funding
challenged their college's use of a referendum to set the priorities for
allocation of student activity fees.'44 Approvingly citing Justice Souter's
138. "War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength." George
Orwell, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 10 (1949).
139. 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005).
140. Id. at 693-95.
141. Id. at 700-01.
142. 508 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2007).
143. Id. at 94.
144. Id. at 97.
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footnote from Southworth, the court rejected the University's argument
that Hazelwood required deference to a college's choice of funding
mechanisms.145  Because Amidon involves an atypical Hazelwood fact
pattern-essentially, a funding dispute among rival student
organizations-its reasoning may not necessarily apply in the more
commonplace, and more worrisome, scenario of censorship by
administrators in defense of some asserted institutional interest.
The legal community was not fully roused to the impact of
Hazelwood at the college level until 2005, when the en banc Seventh
Circuit became the first to apply Hazelwood in the context of a student-
run campus newspaper. In Hosty v. Carter,14 6 the court dismissed the
First Amendment claims of student editors at Illinois' Governors State
University, whose newspaper was shut down by college
administrators.147 The newspaper, Innovator, angered Governors State
officials with a series of sharply critical articles that administrators
termed biased and factually inaccurate.148 The University responded by
ordering the printer to refrain from printing any future editions unless an
administrator pre-approved the content.149
A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit sided with the student
editors,150 but the en banc court, applying Hazelwood, reversed.'5 ' The
majority disposed of the editors' claims on qualified immunity
grounds,152 holding that the legal status of the Innovator was sufficiently
murky that Governors State administrators would not have known how
145. Id. at 105 (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring)).
146. 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
147. Id. at 731.
148. Id. at 733.
149. Id.
150. Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc, 412 F.3d
731 (7th Cir. 2005).
151. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 738-39.
152. The doctrine of qualified immunity is a construct of constitutional tort
law that permits individual government actors to escape personal financial liability
for judgment calls made in the course of discharging their official duties. The
doctrine has become a formidable obstacle for plaintiffs, because it permits recovery
only where the government official disregards "clearly established" legal precedent
on facts similar enough to give notice that the challenged behavior was unlawful.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), receded on other grounds by,
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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much control they could lawfully exert. The court embarked on a
rambling and not entirely coherent expedition through forum doctrine,
suggesting without firmly concluding that the Innovator likely would
have qualified for heightened First Amendment status as a designated
public forum-a question mooted when the case was pretermitted on
immunity grounds.154 A dissent by Judge Diane Wood had the better of
the logic, pointing out that, until the majority muddied the constitutional
status of college newspapers by introducing Hazelwood into the
discussion, decades of unbroken precedent established that shutting
down a newspaper to silence criticism was forbidden.
Hosty provoked near-unanimous condemnation to the point that
it impelled legislators in Illinois to enact remedial legislation, the College
Campus Press Act, restoring the status of college publications to their
pre-Hosty position.156 Legal scholars criticized the majority both for its
inartful application of Hazelwood and forum doctrine, as well as for its
apparent indifference to the practical consequences of failing to draw a
bright line categorically protecting college journalists. 157
The divide among the circuits continues to the present, and
manifests itself in disparate outcomes. In 2010, both the Third and Fifth
153. Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739.
154. Id. at 736-37.
155. Id. at 742 (Wood, J., dissenting).
156. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 13 (West 2007); see also Moore v. Watson,
838 F. Supp. 2d 735 (N.D. 111. 2012) (describing and applying College Campus Press
Act to a case involving an adviser and student editor removed by college to punish
editorial content decisions).
157. See, e.g., Carter, Kemper & Morgenstern, supra note 74, at 181
(expressing doubt that the "disassociation" rationale of Hazelwood logically applied
to the student-run extracurricular newspaper in Hosty: "That readers would associate
the content of the Innovator, the student newspaper, with the university
administration is not clear and is not addressed by the en banc majority's opinion.");
Kerry Brian Melear, The First Amendment and Freedom of Press on the Public
University Campus: An Analysis of Hosty v. Carter, 216 ED. LAW REP. 293 (April 5,
2007) ("[T]he decision in Hosty fails to consider the striking differences in age and
maturity between students on the postsecondary and K-12 levels."); Laura Merritt,
How the Hosty Court Muddled First Amendment Protections by Misapplying
Hazelwood to University Student Speech, 33 J.C. & U.L. 473, 484 (2007) (asserting
that the Hosty majority's characterization, that the minimal level of Hazelwood
protection applies whenever school money is used to subsidize speech, "sets the tone
for the entire decision, and it gets Hazelwood wrong").
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Circuits heard First Amendment challenges to student disciplinary codes
at the University of the Virgin Islands and Louisiana State University
(LSU), respectively. In the Virgin Islands case, the code prohibited
"offensive" and "unauthorized" speech. At LSU, the code banned
"extreme, outrageous or persistent acts, or communications that are
intended or reasonably likely to harass, intimidate, harm or humiliate
another."1 The courts applied strikingly different approaches and
reached opposite conclusions. The Fifth Circuit upheld the LSU
regulation, primarily applying the Tinker "substantial disruption"
standard but also, in passing, quoting Hazelwood's admonition that "[a]
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission." 1 60 The Third Circuit struck down sections of the
Virgin Islands code, carefully elaborating the distinctions between high
school and college life: the maturity of the students; the educational
missions of the institutions; the administrators' roles; and "the fact that
many university students reside on campus and thus are subject to
university rules at almost all times."'
1 6 1
B. Recent Rulings Have Dangerously Extended Hazelwood into the
Realm of College Discipline for Course-Related Speech
In a string of recent cases, federal courts have confronted the
issue that the Tenth Circuit resolved in the College's favor in Axson-
Flynn: Whether a student has a constitutionally protected right to object
to course assignments. In each recent case, courts have applied
Hazelwood to find that no such right exists, even where the student spoke
privately outside of a classroom setting, and even where the consequence
of speaking out was expulsion.
The most recent and significant of these cases began when Julea
Ward, a graduate student at Eastern Michigan University in training to
become a guidance counselor, told her clinical supervisor that she was
uncomfortable seeing one of the clients assigned to her for counseling as
158. McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir. 2010).
159. Esfeller v. O'Keefe, 391 F. App'x 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2010).
160. Id. at 341 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988)). Ultimately, the court upheld the code on the basis of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
161. McCauley, 618 F.3d at 243.
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part of a course-assigned practicum.162 Ward explained that, because of
her strong religious opposition to homosexuality, she would prefer to
assign the client-who sought counseling about a same-sex
relationship-to a different practicum student.163 Ward was removed
from practicum duties and given a letter initiating disciplinary
proceedings on the grounds of violating the professional standards of the
American Counseling Association. After a formal hearing, a
university disciplinary panel expelled Ward from the counseling
165program.
The district court concluded that, because Ward's dismissal
"arose within the curricular context of the clinical Practicum," and
because the course itself was "not created as a public forum," her speech
was entitled only to the Hazelwood level of protection.166 Nevertheless,
the court found a triable issue of fact as to whether, in asking to refer the
client to a more appropriate counselor, Ward was in fact acting
consistently with professional standards-and if so, whether
"professional standards" were a pretext for the college to retaliate for her
religious speech.167
The University appealed, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 16In
explaining why Hazelwood should apply even to speech by graduate
students, the court stated:
For the same reason this test works for students
who have not yet entered high school . . . it works
for students who have graduated from high school.
The key word is student. Hazelwood respects the
latitude educational institutions-at any level-
must have to further legitimate curricular
objectives . . . . Nothing in Hazelwood suggests a
stop-go distinction between student speech at the
162. Ward v. Members of the Bd. of Control of E. Mich. Univ., 700 F. Supp.
2d 803, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
163. Id.
164. Id at 808.
165. Id at 809.
166. Id. at 814.
167. Id. at 815.
168. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012).
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high school and university levels, and we decline to
create one.'
Like the trial court, however, the Sixth Circuit declined to dismiss
Ward's claims. The court found a disputed issue as to whether the
discipline was motivated by the unprofessionalism of Ward's speech-in
which case, the court suggested, it would be lawful-or by the religious
content of the speech.o70
Because it adds the Sixth Circuit to the roster of those extending
Hazelwood onto the college campus, Ward is the most meaningful of the
recent "curriculum objector" cases, but it is far from the only one. A
year before the Ward ruling, its outcome was presaged by a federal
district judge's ruling in Heenan v. Rhodes.'7 i
Judith Heenan, a fifty-one-year-old graduate nursing student at
Auburn University, claimed that her college piled strikes onto her record
in retaliation for her complaints about the unfairness of the grading and
disciplinary systems, to the point where she accumulated enough
demerits to be expelled.172 Heenan testified that, after she became
known for complaining to other faculty members about her instructor's
allocation of disciplinary "points," she was targeted for closer scrutiny
and verbal abuse. 73 Her complaint involved four separate clashes with
her supervisor that resulted in the assignment of four disciplinary
"points," which triggered a performance review that resulted in her "dis-
enrollment" from the School of Nursing.174
Heenan argued that the school could not punish her for speaking
in opposition to school policies without surmounting the "disruption"
burden of Tinker.75 But the district court instead categorized Heenan's
169. Id. at 733-34. Notably the Ward court never cited the circuit's earlier
foray into Hazelwood, Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc), in
which the court declined to apply Hazelwood to a censorship claim involving a
college yearbook. While the rulings appear difficult to reconcile, it is possible to
read Kincaid as accepting the Hazelwood forum analysis but simply concluding that,
under the circumstances, the yearbook constituted a limited or designated public
forum.
170. Ward, 667 F.3d at 737-38.
171. 757 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (M.D. Ala. 2010).
172. See id. at 1234-35.
173. See id. at 1232.
174. See id. at 1232-33.
175. Id. at 1236.
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complaints as curricular speech subject to Hazelwood,176 even though her
remarks were made during one-on-one clinical observations with a
faculty adviser and in private meetings with faculty, rather than in class
or in a school-financed medium. The court acknowledged it was
applying a broad reading of Hazelwood, but found it to be consistent
with the expansive use of the doctrine elsewhere: "Heenan's case does
not directly involve the school-sponsored dissemination of student
speech. However, the law in Hazelwood has been adopted by other
courts faced with the question of what protections are due student
expression that touches upon internal school matters of pedagogical and
curricular concern."1 7 7 The judge concluded that, "where a student's
speech threatens a school's pedagogical and curricular system, it is not
subject to the expansive protections applied to student political speech
under Tinker."'7 8
Exemplifying the malleability of what qualifies as a legitimate
curricular justification, the court found that the college had a legitimate
interest in teaching its students to refrain from complaining about their
grades and to accept that poor grades reflected their own deficient
performance: "[O]ne of the traits of a good teacher is the ability to get a
student, finally, to stop blaming others (including her teacher) for the bad
grade she has received.,,179 This, like the Ninth Circuit's acceptance in
176. See id. at 1237.
177. Id. at 1237-38.
178. Id. at 1238. The implication that Tinker protects speech addressing itself
only to national political concerns and not speech challenging school policies is
flatly contradicted by a number of post-Tinker rulings, most notably among them
Lowry v. Watson Chapel School District, 540 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2008), in which the
Eighth Circuit rejected exactly the distinction relied on by the Heenan court and
ruled that a student demonstration protesting the school dress code was protected
Tinker speech.
179. Heenan, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (parentheses in original). In addition to
being a dubious application of Hazelwood, the court's determination on this point
almost certainly was error because it presumed that Heenan's protests about the
grading and disciplinary systems were unfounded pretexts for her own failings as a
student, rather than (as Heenan attested) the complaints of a whistleblower exposing
a capricious grading system. If this was not a misapplication of the summary
judgment standard, which required presuming the truth of Heenan's factual evidence
and all reasonable inferences therefrom, then the other possibility is even worse:
That the truth of the complaints was immaterial, and that the college could expel
Heenan for being a complainer even if her complaints were well-founded. If that is
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Brown of "conformity" as a legitimate educational objective,'s makes
essentially every punishment for speech self-validating, as it can always
be said that silencing complaints was part of the school's educational
purpose. It takes little imagination to envision how a college bent on
retaliation might put a "complaints are not protected speech" standard to
malicious use.
In response to Heenan's petition for reconsideration, the court
issued a corrected opinion that more carefully distinguished punishable
from non-punishable speech.' 8 The ruling clarified that complaints
about coursework made in private social conversations, such as hallway
chatter with classmates, were not properly punishable under
Hazelwood.182 Still, the judge reasserted that "grievances that were made
to, or in the presence of, her instructors and supervisors and were related
to her training" constituted curricular speech that was, under Hazelwood,
punishable on the basis of any legitimate educational purpose.1
Ward and Heenan are the clearest illustrations of the breadth
with which Hazelwood is being applied at the college level, but they are
not isolated outliers. A case resembling Ward, Keeton v. Anderson-
Wiley,184 involved a dispute between Augusta State University (ASU)
and a counseling student who, like Julea Ward, held strong religious-
based beliefs that homosexuality is immoral.
Jennifer Keeton repeatedly voiced her views to professors and
classmates in her program, including relaying an interest in "conversion
therapy" to change the behavior of gay and bisexual people. 86 Keeton
told an instructor that "it would be hard to work with the population" of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual (LGBT) students in light of her
the way future courts interpret Heenan, then it is no exaggeration to say that
Heenan's incorporation of Hazelwood eviscerates constitutional protection for
whistleblowers.
180. See supra notes 130-138 and accompanying text.
181. Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (order upon
reconsideration).
182. Id. at 1321.
183. Id.
184. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Ga. 2010), aff'd,
664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
185. Id. at 1372.
186. Id. at 1372.
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profound moral opposition to homosexuality.187 A classmate reported to
the school that Keeton had expressed interest in "conversion therapy," an
approach that attempts to counsel patients into abandoning
homosexuality. The school placed Keeton on a "remediation plan"
that, under school policy, was mandated when a student exhibited
unsatisfactory progress on "interpersonal or professional criteria
unrelated to academic performance."l 89 The penalty for refusing to
complete the remediation was expulsion. Keeton declined to participate
in the plan, which called for her "to increase [her] exposure and
interaction with gay populations," and take part in other diversity-
. . .190
sensitivity measures.
The district court, applying Hazelwood, found no constitutional
violation in imposing the remediation requirement, because it advanced
Augusta State's legitimate pedagogical interests.1 91 The court treated
Keeton's espoused anti-gay views as "curricular" speech because they
occurred in the context of her schooling, and because they violated
principles of professional ethical conduct intrinsic to Augusta State's
187. Id. at 1371 n.2.
188. Id. at 1372. This fact is a matter of some inconsistency between the
district court and Eleventh Circuit opinions. At the circuit court level, the court
elaborated further and found that Keeton not only "expressed interest" in conversion
therapy, but that she actually intended to try to "convert" gay youths herself, and if
she was unable to do so, would refer them to a practitioner of "conversion." Keeton,
664 F.3d at 869. This is a crucial and perhaps decisive distinction, because
indicating philosophical disagreement with the standards of the profession is
different from indicating an intent to violate those standards. The distinction is made
effectively in Judge William Pryor's Keeton concurrence, in which he observes that
the evolution of medicine often has benefited from practitioners' willingness to
challenge orthodoxies, such as the once-accepted notion that homosexuality was a
mental disorder requiring treatment. Id. at 882 (Pryor, J., concurring). Judge Pryor
emphasized the importance of protecting students' ability to espouse unpopular
views that, when aired in the marketplace, may gain acceptance: "[W]e have never
held that Hazelwood permits a public university to punish a student's expressions of
opinion when the speech is not school-sponsored or does not suggest the school's
approval." Id. (Pryor, J., concurring).
189. Keeton, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 n.2.
190. Id. at 1373.
191. Id. at 1379.
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curriculum.192 The court repeatedly invoked the lower court's ruling on
comparable facts in Ward, decided only a month earlier.193
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit largely followed the trial court's
reasoning and affirmed.194 Applying forum analysis, the court defined
the ASU "counseling program" as the forum, rather than the physical
space in which Keeton made her remarks. Defining an academic
program as a forum is not an intuitively logical extension of Hazelwood,
since Hazelwood concerned the forum status of an actual vehicle for
speaking to a public audience. (The forum in Hazelwood was the
Spectrum newspaper, not the journalism program as a whole.)
Moreover, characterizing the academic program as the forum is self-
fulfilling, as it will never be the case that an entire collegiate course of
study is held open for indiscriminate public use so as to qualify as a
forum. (Indeed, it is not clear how an institution could designate an
academic program as a forum.) The sleight-of-hand that leads from
speech taking place in a location to speech taking place in a context is
filled with portent. A speaker can, without much uncertainty, change the
location of her speech, for example, by submitting a column to the
community newspaper if the column is removed from the campus paper.
But choosing an alternative "context" is another matter, as it is far from
certain where the boundaries of that "context" begin and end, and it is
increasingly apparent that courts will treat speech as occurring in the
"context" of a course even if it occurs outside of the classroom.
Having identified the forum, albeit imprecisely, and having
unsurprisingly concluded that the program was a nonpublic forum, the
court proceeded to accept, and defer to, the school's asserted
justifications for ordering Keeton to accept remediation. The court
explained that it regarded Keeton's speech as curricular because it was
made in the course of her participation in "'a school -sponsored
expressive activit[y] '-that is, the clinical program-and that the
counseling program (including the remediation program) are "'part of the
school curriculum"' and are "'supervised by faculty members and
192. Id.
193. Ward v. Wilbanks, No. 2:09-cv-11237, 2010 WL 3026428 (E.D. Mich.
2010), rev'd, 667 F.3d 727 (2012).
194. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (1Ith Cir. 2011).
195. Id. at 871.
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designed to impart particular knowledge or skills."'l 9 6 Overruling the
College's decision to order remediation, the court concluded, "would
interfere with ASU's control over its curriculum."' 9 7
Similarly, a federal district court in California found no
actionable First Amendment claim where a student at a teacher's college
alleged that he was coerced as part of class activities to affirm political
views with which he strongly disagreed.198 The student, Stephen Head,
testified that his instructor force-fed students a diet of his personal
political opinions, including using class time to advocate for a statewide
ballot proposition.199 Proceeding pro se, he alleged that his rights were
violated when the instructor repeatedly forced him to redo assignments
without reference to sources and ideas that did not conform with her own
"multicultural" ideological views, then assigned low grades even to the
resubmitted work.20 0 Nonetheless, in finding in favor of the University,
the court concluded that "foster[ing] educators who can function
effectively and sensitively in the multicultural, multilingual . . .
environment of today's secondary schools" is a "legitimate pedagogical
201
purpose" in furtherance of the University's curricular mission.
Taken together, these cases represent a breathtaking expansion
of the Hazelwood doctrine, and a concomitant shift in the balance of
individual liberty versus "law-and-order" punitive authority.
196. Id. at 875 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 570
(1988)). The court cited Hazelwood's formulation of school-sponsored expressive
activities as including school publications, theatrical productions, and other such
means of creative expression, but did not explain how a counseling program fit
within that classification. Id. (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 570).
197. Id.
198. Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Calif. State Univ., No. C 05-05328 WHA, 2006
WL 2355209 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006), aff'd, 315 Fed. App'x 7 (9th Cir. 2008).
199. Id. at *2.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *7. The court further held, that the student's (evidently inartful)
complaint failed to demonstrate facts supporting his primary theory, that he was
compelled to speak in ways contrary to his own ideological and religious beliefs. See
id The court found that, although Head may have been forced to listen to speech
contrary to his own world-view, he personally was not forced to espouse any
particular belief: "Learning the premises does not necessarily include believing in
them. Learning the course material in no way compromises one's personal right to
believe as he wishes." Id. at *6.
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C. Hazelwood is Unsuited to Cases Where Adult-Age College Students
are Suspended or Expelled for Their Speech
The jurisprudence of student speech rights has been described,
,,202
aptly, as a "mixture of muddled reasoning and inconsistent decisions.
Cases like Ward only exacerbate this confusion, by introducing the
Hazelwood framework into plainly inapplicable settings. If none of the
purposes animating Hazelwood apply, the analysis becomes a matter of
deference for deference's sake.
1. Hazelwood's "Maturity" Rationale is Inapplicable
There is no indication that any of the disputed speech in the
Ward or Heenan cases took place in a classroom or in front of other
students; thus, there simply was no audience to protect. In both cases,
the speakers were graduate students over thirty years of age, a fact that
203
neither court afforded any recognition. Because neither the speakers
nor the listeners were impressionable children in need of protection from
unsuitable material, Hazelwood's concern for "the emotional maturity of
the intended audience" 204 is of no moment.
More broadly, notions of shielding delicate ears against
dangerously complex or challenging ideas is dissonant with the long-
202. Brownstein, supra note 47, at 721. See also Carter, Kemper &
Morgenstern, supra note 74, at 182 (summarizing survey of post-Hazelwood rulings
from federal appellate courts: "[T]here is substantial confusion and disagreement
between commentators on one side, and the federal courts of appeals on another,
regarding whether Hazelwood's principles may be applied not only to high school
journalism students but also college students in a variety of speech contexts.").
203. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012). Sympathizers with the
college might attempt to view Ward's case as one involving the speech her
instructors anticipated her giving to a future counseling client-and indeed, had
Ward actually counseled a client in an unprofessional manner, the equities would
balance out quite differently. But those are not the operative facts. See id. Ward
testified that, were she made aware that a student was seeking affirmation that there
is nothing wrong with being homosexual, she would decline to accept that referral
and assign the student to a different counselor-in other words, she would take
affirmative steps to avoid giving advice inconsistent with the school's teachings. See
id.
204. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
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accepted role of the college as "peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."'
2 0 5
The Supreme Court has long displayed exceptional solicitude for the
First Amendment in the college setting, suggesting that the bar will be
especially high to justify the exclusion of ideas on "audience protection"
grounds.206 For example, the Court overturned expulsion of an
independent newspaper editor at the University of Missouri whose
publication, The Free Press Underground, included strong profanity and
a cartoon depicting the Statue of Liberty and Lady Justice being raped by
207
police officers. In ordering the student reinstated, the Court held that,
"the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good
taste-on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name
alone of 'conventions of decency."'
2 08
In settings beyond First Amendment speech, college students
have been recognized as having rights greater than those recognized at
the K-12 level. For instance, a college almost certainly has less latitude
to compel a student to submit to an invasive bodily search than does a K-
12 school.209 It iS incongruous with the law's otherwise consistent
205. Healy v. James, 408 U.S 169, 180 (1972). See also Lauren E. Tanner,
Rights and Regulations: Academic Freedom and a University's Right to Regulate the
Student Press, 86 TEX. L. REV. 421, 421 (2007) ("Colleges and universities ... exist
as the archetypal marketplace of ideas that the First Amendment aims to create.").
206. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 835 (1995) (holding that the danger "to speech from the chilling of individual
thought and expression . . . is especially real in the University setting, where the
State acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the
center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition"); see also Meggen Lindsay,
Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free Speech Standards Should Not Apply
to Post-Secondary Students, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1470, 1483 (2012)
(observing that, since Tinker, the Supreme Court "has never upheld a student-speech
restriction at the university level" and "has not linked high school- and college-
speech rights").
207. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 667 (1973).
208. Id. at 670.
209. See Carboni v. Meldrum, 949 F. Supp. 427, 434 (W.D. Va. 1996)
(observing that, in the context of a strip-search of a graduate student suspected of
concealing notes on her body to cheat on an exam, "[t]hough higher education
administrators must be allowed to make discretionary decisions, university officials
simply do not exercise the same level of disciplinary control over their students as do
public school teachers and principals") (citations omitted). See also Laura K.
Schultz, A "Disacknowledgment" of Post-Secondary Student Free Speech-Brown
v. Li and the Applicability of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier to the Post-Secondary
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treatment of adult-aged college students-who are eligible to vote, join
the military, purchase firearms, sign contracts, incur civil and criminal
liability in adult court and otherwise bear the legal indicia of
adulthood-to regard them as "constitutional children" whose speech is
of no greater legal dignity than that of an eighth-grader.
2. Hazelwood's "Disassociation" Rationale is Inapplicable
The Supreme Court justified its retreat from Tinker by reference
to a school's need to distance itself from speech that is of poor quality so
as to undermine the teaching of sound research and writing skills, or that
might be mistaken for a statement of the school's position on a political
controversy.2 10 When speech is made in private meetings or during one-
on-one teaching sessions, as in Ward or Heenan, neither of these
justifications plausibly applies.21 1 Moreover, no listener who happened
to hear Julea Ward question her school's curriculum could conceivably
believe she was speaking as an official representative of the college or
delivering a message approved by the college.
In the broader sense, it will rarely if ever be the case that a
reasonable listener would confuse the message of an individual college
212
student for that of the institution. A school or college does not speak
through its students any more than a business "speaks" to the public
Setting, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1185, 1206-08 (2003) (discussing legal and practical
differences between secondary and postsecondary student speakers).
210. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988)
(finding that "the question ... addressed in Tinker" was different than the current
question "concem[ing] educators' authority over school-sponsored publications" and
that schools acting as publishers were able to censor speech because of its poor
quality or that was inconsistent with social values).
211. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 731 (6th Cir. 2012). At issue in Ward was
the plaintiffs refusal to communicate certain beliefs, and this issue was discussed by
Ward with her faculty supervisor, rather than in a public setting. Id See also Heenan
v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
212. The Supreme Court made a similar observation in the context of a
student-produced newspaper at the University of Virginia containing religious-
themed content: "the government has not fostered or encouraged any mistaken
impression that the student newspapers speak for the University." Rosenberger v.
Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995).
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through its customers. It is well established that colleges cannot be
held liable for the speech of their students because they have no legal
authority to dictate what they say. As a Louisiana court held in relieving
a university of liability for an allegedly libelous article published in a
campus newspaper:
The relationship between a university and its
student newspaper is anomalous and cannot be
compared with a publisher and its newspaper. The
latter may exercise censorship to the fullest, as it
deems commercially proper to do so, but the
former is almost completely barred from censoring
its student paper since that would be prior restraint
and would impede the free flow and expression of
.214
ideas.
Importing Hazelwood into the college setting risks muddying this sound
apportionment of responsibility, which has enabled college journalism to
thrive. If colleges perceive that they are no longer constitutionally
estopped from overruling the judgment of student editors, at least some
will be tempted to meddle in editorial judgments, perhaps invoking
liability concerns as a pretext.215
213. See, e.g., Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 433-43 (2002)
(holding that school cannot be liable for violating federal privacy law based on the
acts of its students, because a student-even while carrying out a teacher's directive
to grade a classmate's paper-is not "a person acting for" the school).
214. Milliner v. Turner, 436 So.2d 1300, 1302 (La. Ct. App. 1983). See also
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (D. Mass. 1970) (holding that an
advisory board with the power to control content published in a student newspaper
constituted an unconstitutional "direct previous restraint of expression"); McEvaddy
v. City Univ. of N.Y., 633 N.Y.S.2d 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (citing Mazart v. State,
441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 605 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1981), in finding that a student newspaper was
not an agent of the university and therefore the university could not be held liable for
defamatory statements therein); Mazart, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (holding a university
immune from charges of libel over a statement made in its school newspaper
because "severe constitutional limitations on the exercise of any form of control by a
State university over a student newspaper" prevented the creation of an agency
relationship that could give rise to liability).
215. The Court recognized this very hazard in Rosenberger, observing that to
hold a university responsible for an Establishment Clause violation merely because it
provides funding to a student newspaper that contains religious articles would invite
institutions to subject students' work to a regime of impermissible pre-publication
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In other contexts, courts have had no difficulty recognizing that
not all speech occurring on the grounds of a school or college is
attributable to the institution, even where institutional resources are
216
used. When campuses play host to student activities addressing
religious themes, courts have consistently held that the mere use of
college facilities and financial support does not make the institution
responsible for the students' religious speech for Establishment Clause
purposes.217 If it is clearly accepted that reasonable viewers understand,
for example, a religious-themed play presented in a campus theater as the
individual speech of the student performers, then the same should hold
true when the speech occurs in the pages of a newspaper or magazine, or
on a university-hosted website.
Especially where the speaker is an adult, the Hazelwood standard
inverts the order of priority of interests. Rather than be concerned that a
speaker's unwelcome ideas might be mistaken by an undiscerning
listener as the speech of the institution, we should worry instead that the
individual will incur reputational harm when the institution places its
words in his mouth (for example, by exercising its authority to rewrite a
"poorly written" or "inadequately researched" 218 editorial column).
3. Forum Doctrine is Neither Necessary Nor Appropriate When Claims
Arise Out of Student-Professor Communications
Cases like Ward and Heenan force us to examine why the forum
analysis exists in the first place, and whether it is helpful or necessary in
review. Rosenburger, 515 U.S. at 844 ("That eventuality raises the specter of
governmental censorship, to ensure that all student publications meet some baseline
standard of secular orthodoxy.").
216. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
250 (1990) (concluding, in reliance on the distinction between tolerating speech
versus affirmatively endorsing and helping disseminate it, that it was constitutional
for Congress to require public schools to grant access to school facilities to student-
organized religious groups on equal terms with secular organizations).
217. See, e.g., Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 762
(7th Cir. 2001) (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 121
(2001), for the proposition that "private religious speech enunciated on government
property is not automatically attributed to the government").
218. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988)
(enumerating factors that justify censorship).
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the setting of a college campus. Although an analytical framework is
meant to provide ease for judges and predictability for those who must
live under their decisions, forum doctrine has accomplished neither
219
objective. Once courts began parsing government property into
absurdly molecular-level subparts---defining the forum as "the tiles on
the wall" rather than "the hallway" or "the school building," for
instance 220-the characterization of the forum became self-fulfilling.
Federal courts have acknowledged that forum doctrine is not a
one-size-fits-all analysis robotically applied to every utterance on
government property. For instance, public employee speech is subject to
its own set of standards,221 analytically paralleling the Tinker approach
that apportions rights based on the status of the speaker, not the property
on which she speaks. Similarly, when asked to pass on the
constitutionality of a federal regulatory regime forcing libraries to install
content filters on public-access Internet terminals as a condition of
qualifying for federal discounts on technology, the Court declined to
apply forum analysis and instead analyzed the case on the basis of
222federal Spending Clause jurisprudence.
219. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1987) (describing
forum jurisprudence as a "byzantine scheme of constitutional rules" that is "virtually
impermeable to common sense"); see also David A. Thomas, Whither the Public
Forum Doctrine: Has This Creature of the Courts Outlived Its Usefulness?, 44 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 637, 716-26 (2010) (extensively cataloguing judicial and
scholarly criticism of the practical and philosophical merits of forum doctrine from
the "perspective of expressive and property rights").
220. See Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
221. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420-22 (2006) (setting forth
distinction between protected speech made in public employee's capacity as a
citizen, versus unprotected speech that is made pursuant to official duties).
222. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205-09
(2003) (commenting that principles of forum doctrine "are out of place in the context
of this case"). Similarly, not all college funding programs-even when conditions
are attached to funding that appear to burden speech or religion-are analyzed by
reference to forum status. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004)
(declining to apply forum analysis in constitutional challenge to state tuition subsidy
program, which withheld eligibility from those pursuing theology degrees in an
effort to avoid excessive entanglement with religion, because a tuition assistance
program "is not a forum for speech").
In view of the animating principles behind the forum doctrine, it
is questionable whether speech by a college student ever belongs in that
structure.223 But it is beyond serious doubt that fact situations like those
in Ward and Heenan do not.224 In Perry Education Association, the
Supreme Court explained that the purpose underlying forum
classification was to enable the government to regulate access to public
225property so as to preserve its character and intended use. A student's
conversation with her instructor occupies no public space, creates no risk
of audience confusion, and presents no inconsistency with the intended
character and use of a college campus.
Neither Ward nor Heenan used a government-provided means of
communication as the conduit for expression.226 Although it appears
clear that in no instance did the disputed speech occur in a classroom
setting in front of an audience of student listeners, in neither case did the
courts afford any recognition to where the student-teacher conversations
took place.227 Location, in other words, is conclusive-except when it is
insignificant. The sloppy doctrinal shortcut undergirding these rulings is
that speech about curriculum equates to curricular speech. If that
understanding of Hazelwood takes hold, then dissenters who question
their schools' academic offerings-or who seek to blow the whistle on
228
institutional wrongdoing-will be at risk of legalized reprisal.
223. See Tanner, supra note 205, at 435 ("Overall, the inability of forum
analysis to protect the university's regulatory authority or students' expressive rights
makes its application entirely unacceptable in the university context because it
undermines the university's educational mission.").
224. See generally Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 731 (6th Cir. 2012); Heenan
v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
225. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
226. See generally Ward, 667 F.3d 727. Rather than active speech through a
government-provided means of communication, the issue was Ward's refusal to
engage in speech with which she disagreed on religious grounds. See id. See also
Heenan, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318.
227. See generally Ward, 667 F.3d 727; Heenan, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318.
228. The Heenan court, belatedly, acknowledged that speech to outside third
parties (such as social friends) about the curriculum could not be classified as
Hazelwood speech. Heenan, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1321. But the court gave no
indication that a student could safely complain internally up the chain of command
confident in the knowledge that her complaints were constitutionally protected, and
to the contrary, strongly indicated that being a complainer was itself a legitimate
justification for punishment regardless of the merits of the complaints. Id. Student-
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Implicitly underlying the application of forum doctrine is the
understanding that the choice to use a governmental channel of
communication is just that-a choice-and that alternative means of
reaching the desired audience exist.229 But in cases such as Ward, courts
plainly are permitting the content-based regulation of speech regardless
of the medium used. There is no suggestion in the district or circuit court
opinions that, had Ward conveyed her dissent from university policy by
spending her personal money to purchase an advertisement in the Detroit
Free Press rather than by speaking with her instructor in a private
conversation, her First Amendment claims would have been analyzed
any differently. (The Ward court notably did not, even while adopting
Hazelwood, use the word "forum" or attempt to define what forum Ward
was using.) If the "forum" is defined by anything that the disciplinarian
decides is relevant to the course, then the "forum" is a little dark
constitutional cloud that hovers over the student's head following her
230
everywhere she goes, whether on government property or private.
Forum doctrine is about control of government property that
speakers seek to use for communicative purposes.231 It is not a floating
infirmity on the content of speech. If the regulation is understood as, "do
speech cases employing Hazelwood to find that dissent from college curriculum is
unprotected speech are unsettlingly reminiscent of the developing body of public
employee law, under which employee complaints about their own working
conditions similarly are held to be unprotected.
229. See Christian Legal Soc'y of the Univ. of Calif. Hastings Coll. of the Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2991 (2010) (noting that law-
student group denied access to bulletin boards, email system and other official
communication channels had alternative non-school-funded methods of
communicating its message to its intended recipients, and observing that "when
access barriers are viewpoint neutral, our decisions have counted it significant that
other available avenues for the group to exercise its First Amendment rights lessen
the burden created by those barriers").
230. See Peter C. Buck, A Better Bargain in Filene's Basement: A Response to
Professor Abel, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1502 n.4 (2006) (describing the iconic
cartoon character from Al Capp's "Li'l Abner" comic strip, Joe Btfsplk, "the forlorn
character who jinxed all around him and whose every move was shadowed by a dark
cloud immediately over his head").
231. See, e.g., Gay Guardian Newspaper v. Ohoopee Reg'l Library Sys., 235
F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1367 (S.D. Ga. 2002) (discussing the three types of forums as
government property and the various restrictions which can be placed on expression
within each of them).
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not say anything, anywhere, that indicates resistance to the department's
policies," that no longer is "forum" speech to be analyzed under the
Perry Education Association-Hazelwood line of cases. Rather, it is a
content-based restriction on speech that, like any in the real world, is
impermissible unless strict scrutiny is satisfied.
Forum doctrine has never been a comfortable fit in the
educational setting. Although Tinker predated Perry Education
Association's formalization of the public forum framework, the concept
existed in Supreme Court jurisprudence at least as early as 1939.232 Yet
nothing in Tinker even hinted that the right to wear an anti-war armband
, 233
might vary within subunits of the building.
Schools are qualitatively unlike other property to which courts
have applied forum analysis. Communication is incidental to the
234function of a railroad car or a bus shelter. Communication is central to
the function of a school. A transit system can eliminate all expression
from the outside of city buses; a school cannot eliminate all expression
from the classroom and hallways, a point Justice Fortas ably articulated
in Tinker: "[P]ersonal intercommunication among the students . . . is not
only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an
important part of the educational process."235
Although Hazelwood itself implicitly recognized that a student
newspaper could qualify for heightened First Amendment protection if
236
operated as a public forum, this theoretical protection may be largely
illusory. Since a newspaper is not a traditional public forum, it can be a
designated public forum only by express dedication by the government
232. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
233. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(nowhere discussing that the wearing of black armbands in protest of the Vietnam
conflict was subject to different levels of constitutional protection in different parts
of the school).
234. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974)
(holding that city was not obligated to accept legislative candidate's political ads on
cards posted inside transit cards, because cards, which were reserved only for
commercial advertising, were not a public forum).
235. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
236. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988)
(recognizing that it would be possible to operate a school newspaper as a designated
public forum by opening its pages to indiscriminate use "by its student reporters and
editors, or by the student body generally").
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or by an unbroken history of being held open for "indiscriminate"
237
expressive use. Rarely, if ever, will the facts unequivocally establish a
student newspaper's forum status. The more likely scenario will be, as
with the Hazelwood East High School Spectrum, that factors point in
varying directions: a board dominated by college employees, or by a
faculty adviser, will have a degree of hiring and budgeting authority, and
a substantial percentage of funding will flow from the college. Absent
an express dedication and with any structural ambiguities, courts will
hesitate (as in Hazelwood itself) to declare that a forum has been created.
To the extent that forum status requires proof of "indiscriminate" public
access, no newspaper functions in this manner and indeed none could.
Members of the general public-or even of the student body as a
whole-do not have any particular claim of entitlement to use the space.
What is left, then, is the prospect of "limited" public forum status, with,
based on the Supreme Court's recent iterations, no greater First
Amendment status than a nonpublic forum.
In a recent case involving censorship of high school journalists,
the Second Circuit decided that, even though the student newspaper at
New York's Ithaca High School bore the outward indicia of forum status,
it was merely a "limited" public forum-and, as such, its content could
be limited to the topics that school administrators deem suitable for the
238
audience. If government officials can redefine the permissible subject
matter on an ad hoc basis, status as a limited public forum is effectively
meaningless.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the circumstances under
which a designated public forum can be abolished. There is little history
of federal courts searching behind the purported justification when an
239
agency closes a forum. Absent any meaningful check, forum
237. See id One example of a school creating a designated public forum open
to indiscriminate use would be the "free expression" boards many schools or
universities have to allow students to express their opinions.
238. R.O. v. Ithaca Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 2011).
239. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that, having created a forum, a
government agency is not obligated to maintain it as a forum indefinitely. See, e.g.,
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). For
an illustration, see the district court's decision in Gay Guardian Newspaper v.
Ohoopee Regional Library System, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1373-79 (S.D. Ga. 2002).
There, a public library removed a table formerly accessible to the public for
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designation is easily abused as a tool of retaliation. The motive to
retaliate is significantly heightened in an institutional setting, since the
governing authority itself will so often be the target of the speaker's
uncomfortably candid, critical, or inquisitive speech. Because courts
have allowed government agencies to freely narrow the permissible uses
of designated public forums, or even to abolish them entirely, forum
doctrine is insufficiently protective of student speakers who-unlike
those seeking to use off-campus public forums--do not have reasonable
alternative means of communication to make themselves heard.240
4. Hazelwood Allows Government Entities to Refuse to Disseminate
Speech, Not to Punish It
Even if there were instances in which Hazelwood made sense at
the college level, in no event should Hazelwood ever apply in the
disciplinary setting. Hazelwood is about the ability of a school to
withhold its name and financial support from speech, not about the
241
ability to suspend or expel a student for having spoken. The
Hazelwood Court expressly struck this distinction in differentiating
between speech that schools must tolerate versus speech that schools can
be forced to promote: "[T]he standard articulated in Tinker for
determining when a school may punish student expression need not also
be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its
name and resources to the dissemination of student expression." 2 4 2
distributing free literature, after some patrons complained about the content of a gay-
community newspaper. Id. The court was untroubled that the forum was closed in
reaction to the (entirely lawful) content of a particular speaker's publication:
"[G]ood public policy reasons exist for allowing a governmental body to close a
hybrid forum such as this in a speech-suppressive manner to avoid reasonably
anticipatable disruption and attendant litigation." Id. at 1375. But see ACT-UP v.
Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (finding that closure of state legislature's
public gallery was unlawful content-based restriction on speech, because it targeted a
particular AIDS-awareness organization). Because there is no well-developed body
of law as to when it is permissible to abolish a forum entirely, students can take little
confidence in the durability of a limited or designated public forum.
240. See, e.g., Gay Guardian, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1362.
241. See generally Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260.
242. Id. at 272-73.
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The Tinker standard is capable of being articulated as a
prohibition carrying punishment: "Do not engage in speech that
substantially disrupts the operations of school."24 3 The Hazelwood
standard is not. A disciplinary rule that codified Hazelwood-"do not
engage in speech that the school has a legitimate pedagogical reason to
punish"-undoubtedly would be struck down as unconstitutional, both
because it is so vague as to give unbridled discretion to disciplinary
authorities and because it fails to give those regulated fair notice of the
244scope of conduct that is prohibited.
Nor are the examples of "legitimate pedagogical justifications"
set forth in Hazelwood consistent with the imposition of discipline.
Hazelwood lets schools distance themselves from speech that is
"inadequately researched," "poorly written," or "ungrammatical."24 5 But
no school would purport to make bad grammar or substandard writing a
basis for suspension or expulsion. The need for a school or college to
teach optimal practices in no way implies the ability to punish those
whose performance falls short of ideal.
Besides being vague and open-ended, Hazelwood simply is not
sufficiently protective when discipline is at issue. Giving the chair of an
academic department the ability to punitively kick a student out of
college for any "legitimate pedagogical basis" almost assures that no
expulsion can be successfully challenged, since a professor's subjective
belief that a student is a poor performer will almost by definition be
regarded as a legitimate pedagogical justification.
Hazelwood involved speech through a vehicle (a school-funded
newspaper) over which the government had complete control; when the
principal gave the order to yank a page, the page was not printed. When
243. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
("[C]onduct by the student . . . [which] disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is . .. not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.").
244. A law or regulation that restricts speech based on content 'is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."' Piscottano v. Murphy, 511
F.3d 247, 280 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108 (1972)). Vague regulations that fail to give those regulated "fair warning" of the
scope of the conduct that is prohibited have been struck down both on First
Amendment and due process grounds. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
245. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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the government controls the on and off switch, there is no need to
contemplate punishment, since the speech never reaches the audience
and the anticipated negative reaction never occurs. Hazelwood is
consequently of no relevance when government seeks to punish, rather
than prevent, unwelcome speech. Because Hazelwood did not disturb
Tinker as to the imposition of discipline, then, suspension or expulsion
for the content of speech is legitimate only if "substantial disruption"
occurs or is imminent.
IV. COMPELLING PRACTICAL AND PUBLIC-POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
DEMAND A STANDARD MORE PROTECTIVE THAN HAZEL WOOD
If none of the legal imperatives animating Hazelwood apply to
disciplinary action against college students-that is, there is neither an
impressionable audience nor a likelihood of audience confusion requiring
disassociation-then it is proper to ask why Hazelwood is even in the
conversation at all. When a rule of deference to a school's management
of a forum becomes a rule of deference to a school's management
without the forum, it becomes apparent that deference for deference's
sake is the objective. The question thus becomes, apart from the plainly
inapplicable justifications from Hazelwood and Perry Education
Association themselves, what other objectives might justify such extreme
deference, and at what cost?
A. Student Users of the "Forum" Cannot be Singled Out for Uniquely
Disfavored Treatment
Although courts have applied the Hazelwood standard to the in-
class speech of K-12 teachers,246 college-level instructors possess a
relatively high degree of free speech protection. The doctrine of
academic freedom, while not defined with optimal judicial clarity,
insulates professors against administrative second-guessing of
246. Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 913-14 (10th
Cir. 2000); Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir.
1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723-
24 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Webster v.
New Lenox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990).
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discretionary curricular decisions. 247  It would be incongruous to give
professors (whose speech is arguably attributable to the government)
more autonomy from the college administrators they work for than their
non-employee students have. If words are unsuitable for a college
audience and might be mistaken for the institution's speech when uttered
by a student, then they are doubly so when uttered by an adult authority
figure.
B. Constitutional Malpractice: Hazelwood Places a Ceiling on the
Evolution of "Teaching Hospital" Journalism on Campus
There is significant societal interest in access to the uncensored
speech of college students. Colleges provide the entire community with
cultural opportunities to hear new and experimental plays and musical
performances, and to view avant-garde works of art. Colleges cannot
effectively fulfill this function if every performance and exhibit is subject
to being shut down because the college wishes to maintain neutrality and
avoid association with controversy.
Colleges are also increasingly the primary providers of news
coverage for their communities.248 Tens of thousands of professional
newsroom jobs have been eliminated since the beginning of a sustained
249
economic downturn in 2008. Coverage of education issues has
247. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985)
(expressing special solicitude for a college's faculty hiring and firing decisions,
grounded in the judiciary's "reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and
local educational institutions and [its] responsibility to safeguard their academic
freedom, 'a special concern of the First Amendment' (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967))). In Ewing, the Court applied an exceedingly
deferential review to a fired medical-school resident's due process claim against his
former institution, finding it was the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate "such a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
faculty did not exercise professional judgment." Id. at 227.
248. See Seth Zweifler, A New Direction: J-labs Turn Classrooms into
Newsrooms, STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR. REPORT, Fall 2012, at 26 (describing how
universities in North Carolina, Maryland, and elsewhere are establishing student-
staffed news bureaus that supply content to professional media organizations or
publish on their own college-hosted websites).
249. See Robert Hodierne, Is There Life After Newspapers? Thousands Upon
Thousands of Newspaper Journalists have Lost Their Jobs in Recent Years in
Endless Rounds of Layoffs, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb./Mar. 2009, at 20; Christine
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suffered disproportionately from this downsizing. A December 2009
study by the Brookings Institution found that education coverage
accounted for only 1.4% of all the time and space devoted to news by
leading print, broadcast, and online media outlets-much of it event-
driven, such as coverage of crimes or disease outbreaks at schools, and
250very little of it discussing larger issues of public consequence.
In light of the retrenchment of professional news organizations,
leading authorities have called on collegiate journalism schools to
assume responsibility for meeting the information needs of the local
community. In an October 2011 report, the New America Foundation
challenged college journalism schools to emulate the model of teaching
hospitals that serve as primary caregivers to underserved communities,
rededicating themselves to creating local news coverage rather than just
teaching about it.21 That challenge was echoed in an August 2012 open
letter from five of the largest philanthropic funders of journalism, who
urged the nation's college and university presidents to transform
journalism schools into "forceful partners in revitalizing an industry at
the very core of democracy." 252
College journalists will understandably hesitate to pursue news
stories reflecting discredit on their institutions if their work product may
be punished, as in Ward and Heenan, with removal from school if it is
253
deemed inconsistent with the school's educational mission. Federal
Haughney, The Undoing of the Daily, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012, at BI (describing
how major daily newspapers including those in Detroit and New Orleans have
abandoned seven-day-per-week print publication in light of dwindling revenues).
250. Darrell M. West, Grover J. Whitehurst & E.J. Dionne, Jr., Invisible: 1.4
Percent Coverage for Education is Not Enough, THE BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 2,
2009), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2009/12/02%20
education%20news%20west/1202 education news west.
251. C.W. Anderson, Tom Glaisyer & Jason Smith, Shaping 21st Century
Journalism: Leveraging a 'Teaching Hospital Model' in Journalism Education,
NEW AM. FOUND. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/
shaping_21st century journalism.
252. Brittany Anas, Open Letter to Universities Calls for 'Teaching Hospital'
Approach to Journalism Education, THE DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), Aug. 4,
2012, http://www.dailycamera.com/cu-news/ci_21236473/open-letter-universities
-calls-teaching-hospital-approach-journalism.
253. Attempts by colleges to censor the content of student publications are
surprisingly commonplace, and college students repeatedly have sought refuge in the
First Amendment-with great success, the Seventh Circuit's Hosty decision
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courts have long recognized that the prospect of content-based
punishment can impose an impermissible "chilling effect," leading
speakers to muzzle themselves, particularly if the trigger point for
254incurring sanctions is indistinct.
If student-produced journalism is subject to sanction up to and
including expulsion from school, the intimidation will impose a chill,
depriving the public of candid news coverage. The Hazelwood
standard-which permits censorship for reasons that include
"associat[ing] the school with any position other than neutrality on
matters of political controversy"255-is flatly incompatible with
journalism, and doubly so with journalism that is expected to meet the
standards of, if not to supplant, the work of experienced professionals.
C. The Ward Conception of Hazelwood Risks Leaping the
"Schoolhouse Gate" into Cyberspace
One of the most difficult constitutional issues perplexing courts
and legal scholars is the status of speech that students create off campus
notwithstanding. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding
that North Carolina Central University violated student editors' First Amendment
rights by withdrawing funding from newspaper in response to editorial opposing
integration of historically black college); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.
1973) (declaring that officials at the University of Mississippi could not prohibit
publication in the student literary magazine of articles containing "earthy language"
and a depiction of an interracial love affair); Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722 (4th
Cir. 1973) (ordering East Carolina University to rescind disciplinary sanctions
against student journalists who published letter calling university president a "four-
letter vulgarity"); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970) (finding that
University of Maryland could not restrain printing and distribution of a student
magazine carrying a photo of a burning American flag).
254. See, e.g., Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d 602, 616 n.7
(6th Cir. 2008) ("[A] statute may be void for vagueness if it would deter would-be
speakers from speaking because they cannot tell whether their intended speech falls
within the statute's prohibitions.") (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72
(1997)); Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 387 (5th Cir. 1989) ("To bypass a
prior restraint requires tremendous verve from the speaker; foolhardiness is another
way of stating the same thing, for the speaker must risk receiving a sanction not for
the speech expressed but for ignoring the screening procedure. Verve is not,
however, a constitutional requirement.").
255. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
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on their personal time and distribute online. The recent drift of court
rulings-almost all, so far, in the K-12 setting-has been to equate off-
campus speech with on-campus speech, either because the speech itself
is viewable at school or because off-campus viewers might react to it at
school.256 Once the distinction between off- and on-campus speech has
been erased, and with Hazelwood unhitched to the use of a government-
provided means of communication, there is a genuine risk that the First
Amendment protection of all speech by students at all times will lose
meaningful constitutional protection.
This is not idle speculation. In a disciplinary case against a
thirty-one-year-old college student punished for speech on her personal
Facebook page, counsel for the University of Minnesota attempted to
convince the Minnesota Supreme Court to apply the Hazelwood standard
to speech on a social networking page on the grounds that the speech
contravened the University's interest in training students to observe
257
professional standards. Although the court declined to go that far and
decided the case in the University's favor on narrower grounds, 25 8 the
fact that the argument was seriously advanced portends the risk that
Hazelwood-a case about the use of a school-funded newspaper to reach
an audience of children-might one day follow adult-aged college
students into their living rooms.
256. For a comprehensive survey of the evolving judicial views of students'
off-campus online speech, see Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for
Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the
Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210 (2009). See also
James M. Patrick, The Civility Police: The Rising Need to Balance Students' Rights
to Off-Campus Internet Speech Against the School's Compelling Interests, 79 U.
CIN. L. REv. 855 (2010) (surveying law regarding school authority over off-campus
speech and proposing a "compelling interest" standard that would require a
heightened showing beyond Tinker before schools could punish purely off-campus
expression).
257. Brett Johnson, Minn. High Court Weighs Online Speech Rights of College
Students-Again, STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR. (April 2, 2012),
http://www.splc.org/news/newsflash.asp?id=2359.
258. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518-24 (Minn. 2012).
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V. COLLEGES CAN AMPLY FULFILL THEIR EDUCATIONAL MISSIONS
WITHOUT RESORTING TO HAZEL WOOD
Because the listening audience on a college campus is capable of
handling mature subject matter and is not physically constrained to
endure unwelcome speech, colleges have no need for the Hazelwood
level of control over what their students say and write.25 First
Amendment doctrine recognizes ample authority for colleges to maintain
order, prevent disturbances, and respond to threats or harassment.
Anything less-speech that merely offends, makes listeners angry or
uncomfortable, or represents a brief distraction or detour from
coursework-is to not merely be tolerated but, on a college campus,
welcomed as a contribution to the truth-seeking clash of ideas.26
First, it is the majority view that speech may be punished if it
imminently threatens a substantial disruption. This authority satisfies the
need to maintain order and to punish the student who, for instance,
launches a profane tirade against the instructor during class.
Second, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions can
be enforced, so as to channel out-of-place speech (e.g. prohibition on
261
leafleting during a midterm exam) into reasonable alternative settings.
Third, under limited circumstances it may make sense to view
certain student-college interactions, such as those in postsecondary
professional programs, as governed by contract theory (provided that
259. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
260. Beckerman v. Tupelo, 664 F.2d 502, 510 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The existence
of a hostile audience, standing alone, has never been sufficient to sustain a denial of
or punishment for the exercise of First Amendment rights.").
261. An illustration of the adequacy of pre-Hazelwood First Amendment
doctrine to address free-speech claims on college campuses can be found in the
district court's analysis in Smith v. Tarrant County College District, 694 F. Supp. 2d
610 (N.D. Tex. 2010), a case involving two college students' challenge to
regulations that denied them the right to wear empty gun holsters as a form of silent
political protest against the banning of concealed firearms on campus. Without
reliance on Hazelwood, the district court assigned varying levels of constitutional
scrutiny to the prohibition based on the location where the students sought to wear
their holsters: In the classroom (reviewed as a reasonable time, place and manner
restriction), and in public outdoor areas of the campus (reviewed under strict
scrutiny). See generally id. Although aspects of the court's analysis are problematic,
the point is that Hazelwood is a solution in search of a problem, a doctrine that adds
nothing of value to the coherent resolution of First Amendment claims.
358 [Vol. 11I
adequate contract-formation formalities are observed). Thus, a law
student who enters into a clinical program that entails access to client
confidences may be sanctioned for breaching a confidentiality agreement
entered into as a precondition of participation.
Fourth, a student may always be downgraded through the
academic process for failure to complete an assignment or a refusal to
follow instructions. Thus, the student who submits an essay about global
warming when assigned to write a book review of Don Quixote can be
assigned a grade fairly reflecting his noncompliance. Given these
sounder and more age-appropriate methods of analyzing First
Amendment claims at the college level, the set of circumstances to which
Hazelwood should properly apply on a college campus may well be an
empty set.
With some justification, courts are hesitant to assume the role of
"grading appeals board," sitting in judgment over whether a book report
262
is an "A" or a "B" effort. But even in the academic context, no one
would seriously dispute that an undeserved grade could be actionable if a
blatantly unlawful cause-and-effect (e.g., "Have sex with me or I'm
changing this 'A' to a 'C"') were demonstrated. If Hazelwood's
expansion is motivated by solicitude for the management of scarce
resources, both of the judiciary and of beleaguered institutions on the
receiving end of raise-my-grade lawsuits, narrower remedies might be
enacted, such as a heightened pleading standard that requires direct
rather than circumstantial evidence of an invidious motivation to survive
a motion to dismiss.
262. See, e.g., Owens v. Parrinello, 365 F. Supp. 2d 353, 360 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)
(applying deferential rational-basis review to community college's decision not to
award certificate to student plaintiff: "Courts . . . should avoid interfering with or
second-guessing a college's academic decisions."); Hammond v. Auburn Univ., 669
F. Supp. 1555, 1560-61 (M.D. Ala. 1987) ("The federal courts have adopted a very
limited role in the review of challenges to academic decisions. . . . [T]he widest
possible range of discretion must be afforded university faculties in their evaluation
of a student's academic performance and eligibility to promotion or graduation.").
See also Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 136 (2d Cir. 2007) (Jacobs, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (dismissively referring to a dispute over the
cancellation of a college student government election as "a case about nothing" and
lamenting that a ruling in favor of the student plaintiffs "will impose on a busy judge
to conduct a trial on this silly thing, and require a panel of jurors to set aside their
more important duties of family and business in order to decide it").
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VI. CONCLUSION
Doctrinally, the distinction between "Tinker speech" and
"Hazelwood speech" could hardly be clearer: Tinker is about speech that
the government is asked to tolerate, and Hazelwood is about speech that
263
the government is asked to affirmatively promote. Courts that rely on
Hazelwood to ratify the punishment of college students who question
institutional policies are obliterating this distinction. While there is
every reason to believe that the Supreme Court would ultimately
vindicate the right of a college student to engage in editorial commentary
about academic issues or to speak out publicly against campus
wrongdoing, the cloud of uncertainty should be removed, because
uncertainty breeds self-censorship.
Just as in the case of public employee speech, student speech is
appropriately recognized as belonging to a category that is sui generis.
The question of whether a teacher union may use school mailboxes is in
no way analogous to the question of whether a student may be kicked out
of college for criticizing the instructor's grading methods, and it serves
no purpose-other than the expedited judicial dispatch of cases that
rightfully should be difficult-to cram the latter into a framework
designed for the former. The relationship between college student and
college arguably is closer to that of citizen and city rather than that of
high schooler and school. A student who is expelled from high school is
legally entitled to an alternative placement that ensures a minimally
adequate education. A student who is expelled from college is not.
Upon expulsion, a student may lose not merely her chance at higher
education but also her job and her home. Expulsion is less like being
removed from high school and more like being banished from one's
hometown. Against those stakes, the possibility of vindication in a
Supreme Court proceeding five years down the road is minimally
reassuring.
263. See Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny:
Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 379, 397
(1995) (noting "Hazelwood's distinction between toleration and promotion" and
explaining "while schools have a responsibility to tolerate certain types of speech,
they need not lend the school's name or facilities to promote that expression").
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Much is made of Tinker's admonition that First Amendment
rights are to be considered in light of "the special characteristics of the
school environment,"264 and courts tend to lean on that passage to justify
affording heightened deference to the decisions of school
disciplinarians.26 5 But it is also a "special characteristic" of the school
environment that affronts to the Constitution often go unwitnessed by the
public and unreported by the victim because of the intimidating power
differential inherent in the student-institution relationship. And it is also
a "special characteristic" of the school environment that violations of
students' First Amendment rights habitually go unpunished. This occurs
because graduation moots eligibility for injunctive relief and qualified
immunity forecloses money damages except in the most blatant cases of
266
intentional wrongdoing. Nothing about the school environment
changes, or should change, the bedrock First Amendment understanding
that, as between the speaker and the government, close judgment calls
must necessarily cut in the speaker's favor so that free expression enjoys
267
the "breathing space"* it requires.
264. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
265. See, e.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 111-
18 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting the "special characteristics" passage from Tinker and
finding that an elementary school acted lawfully in suspending a ten-year-old who,
as part of a class assignment, drew a crayon picture of an astronaut in which the
cartoon character expressed a wish to "blow up the school with the teachers in it");
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 520-21 (Minn. 2012) (quoting that
passage from Tinker repeatedly and purporting to recognize a new First Amendment
exception allowing public universities to punish speech that "violates established
professional conduct standards").
266. See, e.g., Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007)
(dismissing college editors' claims for injunctive relief arising out of the retaliatory
discharge of their journalism adviser, where the students had graduated while the
case was on appeal, thus mooting their case as they could no longer benefit from an
injunction restoring the adviser to his former role). See also Moore v. Watson, 838 F.
Supp. 2d 735 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (finding that, although student editor's First
Amendment rights were violated when college fired him in retaliation for articles
questioning school spending, no remedy was available because student had left
school and was ineligible to reenroll).
267. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in
the area only with narrow specificity.").
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The instinct to defer to an instructor when speech concerns the
content of curriculum is perhaps understandable. Courts hesitate to
intercede partly out of respect for academic freedom and for the
subjective professional judgments inherent in the student-professor
relationship. But courts also at times appear to hesitate because they
regard matters of daily school governance (e.g., who gets to play
basketball or participate in cheerleading, who wins a student council
election, who gets an "A" on a term paper) as too immaterial to "make a
federal case out of them." 26 8 That the stakes may appear penny-ante to
adult eyes does not mean that no redressable constitutional injury
occurred.269 Federal judges did not tell Paul Cohen he was wasting their
time with his refusal to turn his jacket inside-out,270 and they should not
tell Judith Heenan that her derailed aspirations for a nursing career are an
271
unworthy use of judicial resources.
Although Hazelwood did not deprive students of all First
Amendment protection-the burden remains on the government to come
forward with a justification "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
268. See, e.g., Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322 (M.D. Ala.
2011) (justifying dismissal of graduate student's claim that she was assigned unfair
disciplinary demerits for speaking out against school policies: "To hold otherwise
would mean that any public university or school student, armed with only with a
personal affidavit challenging her grades, could obtain court review of those grades,
with the result that, across the country, courts would then be, impermissibly, in the
business of routinely reviewing school grades.").
269. The First Amendment recognizes that an act of government retaliation
can inflict a cognizable injury even if the speaker is not deprived of a
constitutionally guaranteed right or benefit, so long as the retaliation is sufficiently
severe as to deter a person of reasonable fortitude from future acts of legally
protected speech. See, e.g., T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d
767, 780 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that school's deprivation of participation in
extracurricular activities, when motivated by a student's bawdy video posted on an
off-campus website, could support a First Amendment claim even though there was
no entitlement to membership on an athletic team: "[A] student cannot be punished
with a ban from extracurricular activities for non-disruptive speech.").
270. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). As the Court observed there:
"This case may seem at first blush too inconsequential to find its way into our books,
but the issue it presents is of no small constitutional significance." Id. at 15.
271. See generally Heenan, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1319-22.
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,272concerns" -in practice, the Hazelwood standard has become a virtual
273
rubber stamp for whatever excuse for censorship a school can muster.
Even if that allocation of authority strikes the right balance for speech
directed to a captive audience of teenagers, blind deference to
government decision-makers is philosophically irreconcilable with the
nourishment of inquisitive minds on a college campus.
The Ward court fundamentally misconceived the rationale for
the Hazelwood standard and, in so doing, introduced the doctrine into a
setting where it serves none of Hazelwood's purposes and upsets the
carefully calibrated balance that for decades has protected individual
274liberty on campus. The operative word in Hazelwood is not, as Ward
asserted, "student."275 The operative word is "forum." Divorced from its
intended context-preventing the misuse of government resources to
convey speech educationally unsuited to its listeners-Hazelwood risks
creating a constitutional underclass of citizens, even accomplished fifty-
year-old professionals, who cannot safely question their government.
272. See Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 797 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) ("[E]ven under Hazelwood, a school does not have completely
unfettered right to restrict free speech.").
273. Whether Hazelwood is a more or less rigorous standard than a plain-
vanilla "rational basis" standard that would normally apply in a nonpublic forum is a
subject of significant disagreement. The Hazelwood Court's reference to "legitimate
pedagogical concerns" has persuaded some commentators that Hazelwood
contemplates a narrower range of deference, because not every rational reason for
censorship will be related to pedagogical concerns. For instance, preserving a
favorable image of the school so as to maintain public support is "rational" in the
sense that it is empirically logical, but it would not be a legitimate pedagogical
justification for censorship, because training students to publish misleadingly
positive information is without educational value. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); see also Dean v. Utica, 345 F. Supp. 2d 799
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (concluding that a principal's desire to suppress truthful factual
information about a lawsuit against the high school was not a legitimate pedagogical
basis for censorship satisfying Hazelwood). Other commentators, however, are
convinced that Hazelwood is a less demanding standard than rational-basis scrutiny
because of the emphasis on the unique qualities of the school environment. See
Tanner, supra note 205, at 431 (describing Hazelwood as a "highly deferential"
standard that amounts to "a rational basis standard of review specially adapted to the
educational context").
274. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727,733 (6th Cir. 2012).
275. Id.
